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Abstract
The Dolev-Yao model is a useful and well-known framework in which to analyze security protocols.
However, it models the messages of the protocol at a very high level and makes extremely strong
assumptions about the power of the adversary. The computational model of cryptography, on the
other hand, takes a much lower-level view of messages and uses much weaker assumptions.
Despite the large differences between these two models, we have been able to show that there
exists a relationship between them. Previous results of ours demonstrate that certain kinds of com-
putational cryptography can result in an equivalence of sorts between the formal and computational
adversary. Specifically:
" We gave an interpretation to the messages of the Dolev-Yao model in terms of computational
cryptography,
" We defined a computational security condition, called weak Dolev- Yao non-malleability, that
translates the'main assumptions of the Dblev-Yao model into the computational setting, and
* We demonstrated that this condition is satisfied by a standard definition of computational
encryption security called plaintext awareness.
In this work, we consider this result and strengthen it in four ways:
1. Firstly, we propose a stronger definition of Dolev-Yao non-malleability which ensures security
against a more adaptive adversary.
2. Secondly, the definition of plaintext awareness is considered suspect because it relies on a
trusted third party called the random oracle. Thus, we show that our new notion of Dolev-
Yao non-malleability is satisfied by a weaker and less troublesome definition for computational
encryption called chosen-ciphertext security.
3. Thirdly, we propose a new definition of plaintext-awareness that does not use random oracles,
and an implementation. This implementation is conceptually simple, and relies only on general
assumptions. Specifically, it can be thought of as a 'self-referential' variation on a well-known
encryption scheme.
4. Lastly, we show how the computational soundness of the Dolev-Yao model can be maintained
even as it is extended to include new operators. In particular, we show how the Diffie-Hellman
key-agreement scheme and the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption can be added to the
Dolev-Yao model in a computationally sound way.
Thesis Supervisor: Ron Rivest
Title: Professor, MIT
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The area of formal cryptography has had two beginnings: the first came in 1978, when Needham
and Schroeder proposed the first set of authentication protocols [53]. The second beginning came
seventeen years later, when Gavin Lowe found a flaw in Needham and Schroeder's public key protocol,
fixed the protocol, and-most importantly-proved that the fixed protocol was correct [38, 39]. What
distinguished these two beginnings from previous cryptographic efforts was the level of abstraction:
the Needham and Schroeder protocols were specified in terms of abstract cryptographic operations
rather than specific cryptographic algorithms. Likewise, the flaw found by Lowe did not rely upon
the properties of the cryptographic algorithms, and existed even in the abstracted system.
What are authentication protocols? There is no exact definition, but the examples share many
characteristics:
1. The protocols are sequences of messages between two or three parties,
2. The messages utilize cryptographic algorithms to "secure" the contents in various ways,
3. The protocol as a whole is intended to perform one or both of two objectives:
" Authentication: over the course of the protocol, one of the parties should gain proof that
another particular party is also participating in the protocol, that they share common
views of the protocol, and that they agree on the values used in the protocol.
" Secrecy: Some or all of the values agreed upon during the protocol should be unknown
to other observers.
Several real-world protocols conform to this definition: SSH [64], TLS [18], and KERBEROS [33]
are the three most widely-known. Being real-world protocols, however, they are quite large and
complex. We will use a much simpler protocol from the literature to illustrate the definition.
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1.1 An Example Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol can be described as a sequence of three messages
between two parties:
1. A -B :{A N,11}13
2. B- A :{N N 2}KA
3. A -* B: {N2|}1K
In this notation, A and B are names or unique identifiers of two parties. Principal A starts the
protocol, and hence has the role of initiator. Principal B responds to A's original message, and
hence has the role of responder.1 A begins the protocol by sending the message JA N, }K, to B,
where
" {M}K is an encryption of the plaintext Al with the key K, and
" M1 M 2 is the concatenation, or pairing, of messages M, and M 2 .
The value N1 is a nonce, a random value generated freshly by (in this case) A, and of sufficient
length to make infinitesimally small the chances of its previous use by any other party. N 2 is a nonce
generated by B, which it includes in the second message.
The protocol assumes the existence of a (collision-free) mapping from names to public keys; Ki
is the public key belonging to the name i. 2 Identity is defined by knowledge of secret keys: Entity
i is defined to be anyone who knows the secret key associated with Ki. When interpreting these
protocols, however, it is usually assumed that secret keys are known by one-and only one-entity,
and never shared or discovered through cryptanalysis.
1.2 Security Goals and Flaws
The Needham-Schroeder public key protocol has both secrecy and authentication goals:
1. Secrecy: The two values N1 and N2 should only be known to A and B. More generally, the
nonces used in the protocol should only be known to the two participants, and
2. Authentication: The initiator and responder should be authenticated to each other. Specifi-
cally:
'Though it is conceivable to have a protocol without analogous roles, they are always found in practice. Also, it
is not unusual for the initiator and responder to use the services of a trusted third party called the server.
2 In practice, this mapping could be instantiated by a PKI or similar mechanism. The situation for secret keys is
similar-a partial mapping from sets of names to keys is assumed-but the analysis typically is more complex.
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" The initiator should know the identity of the responder (i.e., that the responder knows
the appropriate secret key) that the responder knows who the initiator is, and that they
agree on the values of the nonces used, and
" The responder should know the identity of the initiator, that the initiator knows who the
responder is, and that they agree on the values of the nonces used.
However, the authentication conditions do not hold. In the attack that Lowe discovered, the
initiator (A) starts a run of the protocol with a malicious entity (M), who then pretends to be the
initiator (M(A)) to a third party (B):
1. A -+ M : fl A, Nil}Km
2. M(A) 
-+ B : {iA, N1}K,
3. B - M(A) : {|N1, N21 KA
4. M -+A : N1, N 2 KA
5. A -+ M: flN21}K,,
6. M(A) -+ B : I N21}Ki
The entity B is fooled by the above attack. From B's perspective, the sequence of messages is
exactly what it would expect from a run with the initiator A. While the initiator A is engaged in a
run of the protocol, it thinks that the responder is not B but M. If, for example, A is an individual,
M is an on-line merchant, and B is A's bank, then when A runs the protocol with M in order to
place an order, M can masquerade as A to her bank to empty her account.
Lowe's fix is to include the responder's name in the second message, making it:
2. B -+ A : {B N, N 2 }KA
With this simple change, he proves that the protocol satisfies the security goals-assuming that the
adversary does not break or otherwise manipulate encryptions (aside from decrypting them with the
appropriate key). The proof of correctness involves two parts: he first proves that any attack on a
large system (i.e., multiple honest parties) could be translated into an attack on the small system of
just two parties. He then used a model checker, a standard tool in the formal methods community,
to exhaustively search the small system for vulnerabilities.
Since Lowe's first two papers, there has been a flurry of interest in the area of formal cryptography,
as this field came to be known. The use of model checkers has been expanded and refined [50],
theorem provers have been shown to be of value [55], and more direct mathematical methods have
proved to be quite useful [63]. (See [43] for a recent survey of the field.) However, all these methods
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share common characteristics, and hence common weaknesses. They all use methods use the Dolev-
Yao model [20], an extremely abstract and high-level framework that bears further and careful
examination.
1.3 The Dolev-Yao Model
The Dolev-Yao model is an early and successful mathematical framework in which to examine
cryptographic protocols. 3 In this model, messages are assumed to be elements of an algebra A of
values. There are two types of atomic messages:
" Texts (T) with two sub-types: identifiers (public, predictable, denoted by M) and random
nonces (private, unpredictable, denoted by R), and
" Keys (AC) with two sub-types: public keys (lCPub) and private keys (ACpriv)
Compound messages are created by two deterministic operations:
" encrypt : ICPub x A- A
" pair : A x A - A
We write {M lK for enc(K, M) and M N for pair(M, N).4 We require that there be a bijection
inv : kPub --+ CPriv
and by K- we mean inv(K) when K is a public key and inv'(K) when K is a private key.
The model places a strong assumption on the set of messages:
Assumption 1 The algebra A is free: every value has a unique representation.
That is, messages can be thought of as being parse trees. This implies, among other things, that
there is no other way to produce the encryption {Ml}K than to encrypt the message M with the
key K. (We discuss this and similar implications of this assumption in more depth later.)
There are two kinds of active parties in this model: honest participants and the adversary. The
honest participants follow the steps of the protocol without deviation. They can engage in multiple
runs of the protocol simultaneously and with different parties. However, the network is assumed
to be completely under the control of the adversary, who can record, delete, replay, reroute, and
3 There are actually several variations on the Dolev-Yao model, each tailored to a specific tool or application. We
provide and discuss a generic example that uses only public-key encryption. There are other versions that use both
symmetric and asymmetric encryption, or simply symmetric, but we do not consider them here.4 When three or more terms are written together, such as M 1 M 2 M 3 , we assume they are grouped to the left. That
is, M1 Al 2 A 3 = pair (pair(Ml, A 2 ), MA3 ).
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reorder messages. This is modeled by letting the adversary be the "central exchange" of the model:
all messages are sent either from honest participant to adversary or vice-versa.
Assumption 2 Each execution of a protocol in the Dolev- Yao model is an alternating sequence of
messages ("queries," qj G A) from the adversary and messages ("responses," ri g A) from honest
principals:
r o q, r1 q2 r2 -- qn-1 rn-I qn rn
(Here, ro is a setting-specific adversary "initialization" that represents any additional information
the adversary could have learned due to the setting and environment.)
The sequence usually contains more information than merely the message contents, such as the
intended or actual recipient, but we will ignore these extra details in this work.
The model makes strong assumptions regarding the adversary. In particular, it is assumed that
every query qi is derivable from the adversary's initial knowledge and ro, ri, r2... ri- 1 . The initial
knowledge of the adversary includes at least the following:
" the public keys (KCPub),
* the private keys of subverted participants (PCAdv C KPriv),
" the identifiers of the principals (M), and
* the nonces it itself generates (RAd) which are assumed to be distinct from all nonces generated
by honest participants.
For a given message M to be derivable from a set of messages S it must be possible to produce it
by applying the following operations a finite number of times:
" decryption with known or learned private keys,
" encryption with public keys,
" pairing of two known elements, and
" separation of a "join" element into its component elements.
To combine these lists of adversary knowledge and abilities:
Definition 1 (Closure) The closure of S, written C[S], is the smallest subset of A such that:
1. S C C[S],
2. M U KUPub U KAdv U ZAdv C C[S],
3. If {\M|}K C C[S] and K 1 E C[S], then M E C[S],
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4. If M E C[S] and K E C[S], then }MI}K C[S],
5. If M N e C[S], then A1 E C[S] and N E C[S], and
6. If M E C[S] and N c C[S], then MN E C[S].
It is the central assumption of the Dolev-Yao model that this closure operation represents the limit
of the ability of the adversary to create new messages:
Assumption 3 If the Dolev- Yao adversary knows a set S of messages, it can produce only messages
in C[S].
Hence, in the Dolev-Yao model, it must be that qi E C[{ro, ri,.. ri-i}].
The model also makes an assumption regarding the honest participants, but it is quite weak and
applies equally to the adversary:
Assumption 4 During a protocol run, the participants (including the adversary) will see only mes-
sages in the algebra A and will respond only with messages in A.
The three assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model-the freeness of the algebra, the limitations on
the adversary, and the restriction of messages to the algebra-are also its weaknesses. It is clear that
these assumptions greatly simplify the task of protocol analysis. The techniques of the Dolev-Yao
model are easy to apply, and the task of protocol analysis in this model has been automated [61].
It is not clear, however, that these assumptions are at all justified, and this casts doubt onto any
method that uses them. It is true that many attacks and flaws have been found even in the presence
of these assumptions. However, if a method based on these high-level assumptions finds no flaws in
a protocol, there still remains the possibility that some attack can be found when the adversary has
an additional, reasonable, ability.
1.4 The Computational Model
The assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model seem especially strong when compared to those made by
alternate models. The other widely-accepted model of encryption and cryptographic algorithms is
that of the field of computational cryptography, which is much lower-level and much less abstract
than the Dolev-Yao model. It regards cryptography as a branch of complexity theory, and regards
cryptographic primitives as algorithms that map bit-strings into bit-strings. Adversaries are regarded
as efficient algorithms, and security conditions are stated in terms of the probability that an adversary
can perform a given calculation in the face of an increasing "security parameter."
For example, in this framework encryption is not an abstract operation but a collection of efficient
algorithms. "Efficient" in this setting means that the algorithm runs in probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT): polynomial-time in the security parameter and with access to a source of random bits.
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Here, the security parameter indicates the amount of time the key-generation algorithm can take to
produce a new (and random) key, and so corresponds roughly to the size of keys.
Definition 2 (Public-Key Encryption) A public-key encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms
(G, E. D) 5:
" G Parameter -+ PublicKey x PrivateKey is the (randomized) key generation algorithm,
" E: String x PublicKey -4 Ciphertext is the (randomized) encryption algorithm, and
* D String x PrivateKey -+ String U {I} is the decryption algorithm, which we assume returns
I whenever the input string is not a valid encryption under the corresponding public key.
It is required that for all values of the security parameter q E Parameter, all messages m, and all
key-pairs (e, d) <- G(1'7), D(E(m, e), d) = m.
Note that the key-generation algorithm is randomized, as is the encryption algorithm. Hence, the
key-generation algorithm produces a probability distribution on keys, and the encryption algorithm
produces a probability distribution on ciphertexts for each message/key pair. Also note that security
parameter 77 is given to the key generation algorithm G in unary (in the form 1") so that G can run
in time polynomial in q rather than in log(77) (the number of bits required to represent the value
of 77). Without loss of generality, we assume that for a given value of the security parameter 77, the
key-generation and encryption algorithms use 77 bits of randomness.
Although the adversary of the computational model is much less limited than its Dolev-Yao
counterpart, it is not all-powerful. It can be any arbitrary algorithm, so long as it is efficient (PPT).
This allows the methods of computational cryptography constrain the adversary, typically by proving
a reduction from an encryption scheme to some other problem. This reduction shows that if any
adversary can break the security of the encryption scheme, it can be modified to efficiently solve some
other particular problem. In particular, encryption schemes can be reduced to problems known (or,
as is more commonly the case, widely believed) to be harder than PPT. Thus, an encryption scheme
that reduces to these problems cannot be (or is unlikely to be) broken by any efficient adversary.
The most basic notion of security for a public-key encryption scheme is that of semantic security.
In essence, this definition of security states that the adversary should be unable to distinguish an
encryption of message no from an encryption of mi, even if the adversary can choose mo and
i1 based on the public key. More explicitly, the definition of semantic security concerns a game
5 The helper sets are:
* Parameter = V,
* PublicKey, PrivateKey and Ciphertext vary between key generation algorithms and implicitly depend on the
parameter, and
e String = {O, 1}*
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Figure 1-1: The semantic security "game"
between the adversary and a "tester" that consists of a series of "experiments." This game is shown
pictorially in Figure 1-1 (where the adversary is shaded to emphasize that it alone can be an arbitrary
algorithm).
" First, the tester receives the security parameter 7.
" The tester then honestly and randomly generates a key pair (e, d) according to the security
parameter it was given and the key generation algorithm G.
" The adversary is given the public encryption key e by the tester and allowed to perform any
computation it likes.
" The adversary then gives the tester any two messages it likes (ino and mi) of the same length.
At this point, it then goes dormant but does not terminate or erase its state.
" The tester flips a coin to produce a bit b, which will determine which of no and mj will be
encrypted.
" The chosen message Ib is encrypted to produce a ciphertext c.
" The tester gives to the adversary A all of the public information to date: the public key e, the
two messages io and i 1, and the ciphertext c.The adversary then resumes computation on
the new input, but begins from the internal state it had when it went dormant.6 It then can
6 The equivalent, "standard" form of this definition has the adversary begin from the same initial state each time,
but the first invocation produces some state information s which is given to the second invocation. However, we will
adopt as a convention for this paper that the adversary keeps state between multiple invocations.
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perform any efficient computation it likes, but must produce a "guess" g.
The adversary "wins" the game if it managed to guess the value of b (i.e., if b = g). Clearly, a simple
adversary that makes a random guess can win half the time. The definition of semantic security
requires that the advantage of the adversary-the degree to which the adversary can do better than
a random guess-must become vanishingly small very fast. In fact, the adversary's advantage must
shrink faster than any polynomial.
In the standard notation (which treats the tester as implicit):
Definition 3 (Semantic Security) A public-key encryption algorithm (G, E, D) is (one-pass) se-
mantically secure 7 if:
V PP T algorithms M and A, V polynomials q, V sufficiently large 7,
Pr[ (e, d) <- G(17);
mO, m 1 , s <- M(17, e);
b 0- {O, 1};
c < Ee(mllb)
A(17, e, 7o,7m , s, c) = b ]&-5 + 1
with the requirement that mo and m1 are the same length.
(Here, the notation "V sufficiently large 4" means "]70 such that V71 > 70." The notation
Pr [a,; a2;... an : P]
means the probability of predicate P being true after running experiments a,, a2 ... an in series.
Lastly, the notation x <- D indicates that x is drawn from distribution D.)
Note that this definition does not specify the ability of the adversary to distinguish between
the two possible encryptions (the adversary's "advantage") at any particular value of the security
parameter, but only in the asymptotic case. In particular, it requires that the adversary's advantage
be negligible:
Definition 4 (Negligible) A function f :I -+ R is negligible in 77 if, for any polynomial q,
f(7) 1 for all sufficiently large 17. If f is negligible in 7), we write f neg(q).
In practice, one proves that any given algorithm meets the relevant definition of security by
proving that if it did not, one could solve some underlying "hard" problem. That is, one might show
7 Technically, the definition given here is that for a different definition of security, usually called general message
(GM) security. However, GM security is well-known to be equivalent to semantic security, and it has a slightly more
convenient form for our purposes.
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that an algorithm is a secure encryption scheme by assuming that there exists an adversary A that
is able to break it. Then one would show that there exists another PPT algorithm that uses A as a
black-box to solve some underlying hard problem.
For example, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is one of the most widely-used intractable
problems in cryptography. In this problem, a family of cyclic groups {G}, is fixed and indexed by
security parameter. Consider two experiments for a given adversary A and value of 'q:
Exp, The adversary is given r7, G,,, a generator g, and a value drawn from the distribution
D = g,gag, g 9ab : a, b +- JGJ}.
The adversary A returns a single bit.
Exp 2 The adversary is given r/, G, a generator g, and a value drawn from the distribution
R = {g, g, gb, gz : a, b, z JGJ}.
Again, the adversary A returns a single bit.
The goal of the adversary is to return a different bit in experiment Exp, than in experiment Exp 2 -
That is, the adversary is being asked to distinguish between the actual Diffie-Hellman value gab and
a random group element gz. The advantage of the adversary in this case is
AdVA,,o = jPr [A returns 1 in Exp] - Pr [A returns 1 in Exp 2]j
It is widely believed that for certain families of groups, the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.
That is, no adversary can maintain a non-negligible advantage as the security parameter grows:
V PPT algorithms A, AdVA,, < neg(rI)
Given this, one might implement a semantically-secure encryption scheme in the following way:
" The key generation algorithm G, on input 1, picks a <- G. The secret key is a and the
public key is (n, g, g').
" The encryption algorithm E takes in the public key (7, g, ga) and message n E Gq. It then
picks a random b <- G,| and outputs the ciphertext (g6 m -gab).
" The decryption algorithm D, on ciphertext (gb, m1 -gab) and secret key a, first calculates (9b)a =
gb , and then outputs the message p . gab/gab =
14
This is the ElGamal encryption scheme [21], which provably reduces to the decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem. That is, if an adversary A can break the semantic security of this scheme, then another
adversary A' can solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The details of the proof are somewhat
technical, but the basic idea is this: Adversary A' gets (g, ga, gb, h) as input and wants to know if
h is the Diffie-Hellman value gab or a random group element gZ. To do this, it gives (77, g, g') to
A, who interprets it as a ElGamal public key. A then produces two messages mo and m, and gives
them to A'. Adversary A' picks a random bit b randomly, and gives mb - h to A as the ciphertext.
If the input (g, ga, gb, h) to A' was from distribution D, then the input to A is exactly as expected
and A will be able to tell that mb - h is the "encryption" of message mIb. Hence, A will be able to guess
b with non-negligible probability. If, on the other hand, the input (g, ga, 9 b, h) is from distribution
R, then the ciphertext mb - h is completely independent of the messages mo and "i,, and A will not
be able to guess b with probability greater than 1/2. Thus, the behavior of A will differ between the
two types of input in a discernible way. The adversary A' (who knows b) can use this difference in
the behavior of A to differentiate between input from D and input from R.
As can be seen from the above proof sketch, the proofs of this model are extremely sound and
specific. The above proof, for example, proves that no efficient algorithm can break the ElGamal
encryption scheme so long as one specific computational problem remains intractable. Similar proofs
exist for specific key-exchange or authentication protocols. However, even the proof-sketch above is
somewhat complicated. The full proof is more complex yet, and proofs of protocols tend to be not
only complex but tedious as well. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that proof techniques like the
one above can be automated in any way. Presently, proofs in this model need to be 'hand-crafted',
and it is difficult to prove general theorems that apply to more than one scheme or protocol.
1.5 Combining the Two
Given how these two models complement each other, it seems an enticing goal to unify them in some
way to gain the benefits of both. While the computational model uses its low level of abstraction to
gain strong proofs, the Dolev-Yao model leverages its high level of abstraction to provide intuitive
and simple proof methods. If the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model could be justified in some
computational setting, then protocol designers could use high-level methods to yield low-level proofs.
Much work has already been done in this area, which we will review in depth in Chapter 5. Here,
however, we will mention one particular result of our own [30] that will motivate the work contained
in the remainder of this document. This result, building on earlier work [4], is an early attempt to
show an equivalence between active computational adversaries and active Dolev-Yao adversaries. In
particular, we showed (albeit in a weak way) that sufficiently strong computational cryptography can
prohibit the computational adversary from producing any message that could riot also be produced
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by the Dolev-Yao adversary.
In particular, we formalize the intuition of Assumption 3 in the language of computational cryp-
tography, using a series of intermediate attempts. Because of the importance of this formalization,
we reproduce it here:
Intuitively, we would like to say that it should be hard for the computational adversary to produce
a single message outside the closure of its input. Informally:
Attempt 1 An abstract encryption operator provides weak Dolev-Yao non-malleability8 if
VPPT adversaries A, VS C A, VM E (A \ C[S])
Pr[N +- A(S) : N = M] <; neg(ij)
Here, Pr[A; B; C : P] indicates the probability of predicate P being true after running experiments
A, B and C in series. The notation x <- D indicates x being drawn from distribution D. If D is
a set, the uniform distribution is used. If D is an algorithm, we use the distribution over output
induced by the distribution of the input and the distribution of D's random coin flips.
Although this attempt contains the desired intuition, there are two small problems:
" It is unclear how a set S of Dolev-Yao messages can be passed as input to a computational
adversary, or how a Dolev-Yao message M can be produced as output.
" It is not clear how the probability relates to the security parameter 77.
The purpose of this section is to make the above definition meaningful. Our main tool for doing so will
be a mapping from Dolev-Yao messages to their computational analogues: probability distributions
on bit-strings. The mapping we present here is congruent to that given by Abadi and Rogaway [3, 4],
adapted to the public-key encryption setting.
The "encoding" of a formal message M, written [M], is a probability distribution that depends
on four things:
* The formal message M,
" The tape (t) which is an infinite sequence of bits. We assume for convenience that we have
random access to this tape, although this can be easily simulated using a standard tape and
some book-keeping. In usage, we will assume that the bits on this tape are random.
" The security parameter 77.
" An arbitrary public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D).
8 Originally called "ideal" encryption in [30]. We use the more descriptive name given here to distinguish it from
the stronger notions we will consider in Section 1.8.
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Definition 5 (Encoding: messages) Let ri E Af be the security parameter. Let t E {0, 1}' be a
random tape, partitioned into a length-rj segment for each nonce and public key in A. Let (G, E, D) be
a public-key encryption scheme. Then for any M E A, the encoding of II, written [M]l, is defined
recursively as:
* If M E R is a nonce, then [M]' = (o-,., "nonce"), where o-A is the value of the tape partition
associated with Al.
* If (M, M-1 ) is a public/private key pair, then [M] = (e, "pubkey ") and [M- t = (d, "privkey")
where (e, d) is the output of G(1P, am). Note that we now explcitly require that the randomness
of the key-generation algorithm be the value uM from the tape.
* If M E M is an identifier, then [M is mapped to (p(M), "id") where y is any (short)
efficiently-computable functions from identifiers to bit-string. That is, we do not care how
identifiers are mapped to bit-strings so long as each identifier is uniquely represented and it is
efficient to compute the encoding of a given identifier.
* If M = M 1 M 2 , then [M] is the mapping from pairs of distributions to distributions given by
[M1], , [M 2], "pair").
If M = {JM'I}K is an encryption, then [AM1 is the mapping from pairs of distributions to
distributions given by KE ([M' , [K?) , [K]t, "enc"
If S C A, then by [S]t we mean K[sljt ,[s2] ,.. .), where s1, S2 are the elements of S in some
canonical order. By [M we mean the distribution
{t +- {0, 1}' ; m +-- [M|fl : m)
The bits on the tape are used to represent the coin flips used to make atomic elements, and we
will later enforce that the tape is filled with random bits. Compound terms are made via either
bit-string concatenation or a computational encryption scheme. Note that the coin flips used by the
encryption algorithm are not taken from the tape. Hence, [jM'I}1] remains a distribution even if
t is fixed.
There are two properties of computational public-key encryption that our encoding mapping will
need to accommodate and will arise later.
" First, public-key encryption is not required to hide the key used to encrypt. We make this
possible leak of information explicit in the definition above by explicitly concatenating each
ciphertext with the encrypting key.
* Secondly, computational public-key encryption is not generally required to hide the length of
the plaintext. For this reason, we need to limit the amount of information about a plaintext
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that will be revealed by its length. We will assume that the length of a message depends only
on the message's structure, not any of its component values. More formally, let the type tree
of a formal message be the same as its parse tree except that each leaf is replaced by its type.
We use the same notation for type trees that we do for messages. Thus, the type tree of a
message {A NI1K (where A E M, N E R and K C KPub) is {M I} . We assume that
the length of a formal message M depends only on A, the type tree of M, and the security
parameter. This is not an unreasonable assumption. The above definition of the encoding
mapping implies that all nonces encode to the same length. The assumption can be trivially
enforced for other type trees by padding out to some maximal length. Thus, we will use 1M]
to designate the unique length of encodings of M.
The encoding mapping allows formal messages to be represented as bit-strings, which allows
formal messages to be passed to and returned by the computational adversary. Furthermore, it
uses the security parameter, showing how the probability in Attempt 1 relates to 7. Thus, we can
re-attempt to translate Assumption 3 into computational terms:
Attempt 2 An encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides weak Dolev-Yao non-malleability if, when
used in
V PPT adversaries A, V S ; A, VM E (A\C[S])
Pr[ t+-{,1}'w;
S <- [S U kJPub U CAdv U IZAdv U A41;
m +- A(117, s) :
n E supp [M] ] < neg(7)
Here, supp D means the support of distribution D. When the support of a distribution contains one
element, we will treat the distribution itself as a singleton set.
This definition is still problematic, however, for two technical reasons. First, the input to the
adversary might be of infinite length. The set S may be of infinite length, or there may be an infinite
number of elements in M, RAd,, /CPub and /CAdv. If any of these are the case, then the restriction of
the adversary to probabilistic polynomial-time is meaningless. No computational encryption scheme
would remain secure against an infinite-time adversary. For this reason, we require that S be of
finite size. The sets M, IZAA, CPub and PCAd, might still be infinite, so instead of passing them as
input we represent them via oracles:
" M,(x) returns (the encoding of) the identifier of the xth participant.
" R'(x) returns the (encoding of) the xth nonce in ZAV,
" PbK,(x) returns the public key of principal x, and
" PrKt(x) returns the private key of x of x e [K-'I if K- E EAdv.
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The second problem is that our results rely upon a technical limitation: acyclicity of encryptions.
A set of encryptions is acyclic if, when K 1 encrypts K1 1 in some element of S, and K 2 encrypts
KrI, and so on, this sequence of keys encrypting keys never loops back on itself. More formally:
Definition 6 (Acyclic) For an expression Al, construct a graph GM where the nodes are the pub-
lic/private key pairs used in the expression. We draw an edge from p1 -+ P2 if in M the private key
K2 1 associated with pair P2 is encrypted with K 1, the public key associated with pl. The expression
Al is acyclic if the graph GM is acyclic.
For example, the message
{|KT1 l}K {|KE }K
is acyclic, but the message
is not. Our results will only hold for acyclic sets S. However, protocols analyzed in the Dolev-Yao
model typically operate in one of three ways:
" Long-term keys are used to encrypt session keys, which themselves never encrypt other keys,
" The present session key is used to encrypt the next session key, but never the previous, or
* Keys are never encrypted at all.
None of these cases will produce cyclic encryptions.
Thus, we arrive at our final security condition:
Definition 7 (Dolev-Yao weak non-malleability) An encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides weak
Dolev-Yao non-malleability if, when used in [.],
V PPT adversaries A, V acyclic finite S C A, VM V C[S],
Pr[ t <- 0, 1}"
m -r()Pn(),r ,-, ,-( o s):
m E supp [M]] neg(r)
The main result of [30] is that this definition can be satisfied by a standard definition of security
in the computational world: plaintext-aware cryptography.
1.6 Plaintext-Aware Encryption
Intuitively, a public-key encryption scheme is plaintext-aware [10, 7] if it reveals nothing about the
plaintext to encryptions created by honest principals, but ensures that the adversary knows the
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Figure 1-2: The basic plaintext-awareness "game" (attempt)
plaintext to any ciphertext it creates. This intuition is represented by insisting that there exist an
"extractor" E that can produce the plaintext of all ciphertexts of adversarial origin. That is, the
extractor is going to play the following game (also shown in Figure 1-2):
* A key pair (e, d) is chosen honestly and randomly according to the key-generation algorithm
G.
* The adversary A is given e and allowed to perform any efficient computation. At the end, it
must produce a ciphertext c.
" The extractor E is given e and c, and must produce a candidate plaintext g.
The extractor "wins" if the guess g is also what would have been produced by decrypting c with
d. An encryption scheme is plaintext aware if there exists an extractor that can win against every
adversary (almost) all the time. If such an adversary exists, then the adversary must know (or
rather, be able to know by running the extractor) the plaintext to every ciphertext it creates.
To formalize (incorrectly) this intuition:
Attempt 3 A public-key encryption algorithm (G, E, D) is plaintext-aware if it is semantically se-
cure and:
I EpPT,V PPT algorithms A,
Pr[ (e,d) <-G();
c - (P, e);
g E (1'7, d, c):
g D(c, d) ]> 1 - neg(rq)
However, the above definition is a contradiction. There cannot be such an extractor for a semantically-
secure encryption scheme. If there were, then the adversary in Definition 3 could simply use it to
decrypt and learn whether the challenge ciphertext c contained message mo or mi as a plaintext.
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Figure 1-3: The plaintext-awareness game (final)
However, all is not lost. The resolution of this difficulty is to limit somehow the extractor
to ciphertext of the adversary's creation. To do this, we define the extractor to use some extra
information that the adversary can provide about its own ciphertexts, but cannot also provide
about the ciphertexts of honest participants.
To accomplish this, the encryption algorithm is redefined to use a random oracle 0(-): an oracle
that provides a random mapping from inputs to bit-strings of sufficient length. The adversary is
also given access to this oracle, but the extractor is now given (as the additional information) all
the oracle queries made by the adversary (as shown in Figure 1-3:
Definition 8 (Plaintext-Aware Encryption) An encryption scheme (G', E', D) is plaintext-
aware if it is semantically secure and
3 EPPT, V PPT algorithms A,
Pr[ (e,d) <-G(1);
c,Q+- AD(Ie);
g <-E(19, e, c, Q) :
g = DO((c, d) ] ; 1 - neg(rq)
where Q is a transcript of every query and response communicated between A to 0().
Giving the extractor access to the adversary's oracle queries in the above definition makes it signif-
icantly more powerful than the adversary in Definition 3, which presumably does not see the oracle
queries made by honest parties. Thus, the adversary can simply run the extractor to learn the
plaintexts of its own ciphertexts, but cannot run the extractor to decrypt the ciphertexts of honest
participants.
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1.7 Our Previous Results
Plaintext-aware encryption, it turns out, is sufficiently strong to satisfy Definition 7. As we showed
in [30]:
Theorem 1 A plaintext-aware encryption scheme provides weak Dolev-Yao non-malleability.
Thus, sufficiently strong computational cryptography can enforce a connection between the formal
and computational worlds. However, Theorem 1-while being true-has a number of weaknesses:
" The formalization of the Dolev-Yao adversary in Definition 7 is weak. Informally, it states that
the adversary cannot create a given message M. That is, the ability of the adversary to hit
one particular target is small. However, the Dolev-Yao algebra is infinite; one would instead
wish to know that the adversary has only negligible probability of hitting any valid target.
" Plaintext-aware encryption requires the use of a random oracle, and hence has been considered
somewhat suspect. The random oracle model was originally proposed as an abstraction for
such algorithms as SHA-1 [54] or HMAC [35]. The idea was to use the random oracle when
proving properties of higher-level schemes, but to replace the external oracle with internal calls
to these algorithms when creating the implementation. However, this does not seem feasible
for two reasons:
1. Recent work [16, 29] indicates that this substitution may not be even possible in general.
2. The random oracle is used in the definition of plaintext awareness to give the extractor a
"window" into the internal state of the adversary (as revealed through its queries). If the
external random oracle is replaced by an internal algorithm, then this window is closed.
Thus, it seems that plaintext awareness requires the use of an external oracle.
However, any plaintext-aware encryption scheme that uses communication with an actual ora-
cle must be both inefficient and untrustworthy. It must be inefficient because both encryption
and decryption require communication with the oracle, incurring an unacceptable communica-
tion overhead. It must also be untrustworthy because the scheme is secure only if the adversary
does not learn the oracle queries. Thus, a plaintext-aware encryption scheme that uses an ora-
cle is only secure if the oracle is honest and communication with it is confidential-two strong
and untenable assumptions.
Hence, the use of the random oracle has prevented the notion of plaintext awareness from
receiving widespread acceptance as a viable goal.
Thus, Theorem 1 shows only that a weak version of the Dolev-Yao assumptions can be satisfied by
a problematic definition of computational security.
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1.8 Results of This Thesis
In this work, we strengthen Theorem 1 in four ways.
Firstly, we investigate stronger versions of the Dolev-Yao assumptions, Assumption 3 in par-
ticular. While Definition 7 fixes the target Dolev-Yao message M, one could consider stronger
definitions that do not. For example, one might consider a definition which stipulates that the
adversary cannot create a message outside the encoding, even if the adversary itself gets to
choose the message to be created. Stronger yet, one might want to show that no matter what
the adversary outputs, it will not be the encoding of any message outside the closure. We call
this intuition strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability:
Attempt 4 An abstract encryption operator provides strong Dolev- Yao non-malleability if
VAPPT, Vfinite, acyclic S C A:
Pr[ t<-{O,1}"'
3M E A \C[S] .m E supp [M] ] < neg(q)
(This differs from Definition 7 in that instead of being universally quantified outside the prob-
ability, M is existentially quantified in the predicate defining success for the adversary.)
Unfortunately, the above property may not be realizable. As we note above, the Dolev-Yao
model is not necessarily restricted to finite algebras. (It is for this reason that the adversary's
knowledge of e.g., lZAdv was represented via an oracle in Definition 7.) If the Dolev-Yao algebra
contains an infinite number of nonces, for example, then every bit-string of the appropriate
length will be the encoding of an infinite number of nonces. Hence, the adversary could be
virtually ensured of creating the encoding of some honest party's nonce by outputting a random
bit-string of nonce length.
The central core of this difficulty is that Assumption 1 (unique representation of messages)
cannot hold even approximately when the Dolev-Yao algebra is infinite but its computational
encoding must fit in a finite space. We consider two possible and mutually consistent resolu-
tions. The first and simpler resolution is to require the Dolev-Yao algebra to be finite. The
second possibility is to somehow give each Dolev-Yao message a unique representation in the
computational setting. We have explored these possibilities in depth and have produced from
them two realizable definitions of strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability (Definitions 10 and 12 of
Section 2).
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* Theorem 1 shows that one notion of security (weak Dolev-Yao non-malleability) is satisfied by
another (plaintext awareness of encryption). There are two ways in which such a statement can
be strengthened. First, one can strengthen the satisfied notion, which we discuss above. The
second is to weaken the satisfying notion, and it is imperative that this be done for Theorem 1.
As we have previously mentioned, plaintext awareness is rightfully considered suspect due to
its reliance on the random oracle. So long as Dolev-Yao non-malleability relies on plaintext
awareness, and hence the random oracle, it will be considered suspect as well.
One of two things must be done. Either Dolev-Yao non-malleability must be shown to be
satisfied by other definitions of encryption security, or plaintext awareness must be re-defined
in a way that does not use the random oracle. In this work, we do both.
* First, we show that Dolev-Yao non-malleability can be satisfied by a weaker, more generally-
accepted notion of encryption security called security against the chosen ciphertext attack
(Definition 13). This notion has been widely studied [57, 52, 59] and there exist efficient im-
plementations [17]. We show that strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability-both the finite-algebra
version (Definition 10) and the infinite-algebra version (Definition 12)-are satisfied by chosen-
ciphertext security (Theorem 5).
I We also propose another definition of plaintext awareness that does not rely on the random
oracle (Section 3.1.2). This definition replies upon an alternate.model of public-key encryption
in which both the sender and the receiver have public keys. Furthermore, both the sender and
the receiver must register their public keys with a trusted third party called the registration
authority. (This is not an unreasonable model. In practice, users already register their keys
with a certification authority.)
Plaintext awareness in this setting requires that the adversary must know (meaning that
an extractor can extract) the plaintext of any ciphertext it creates, so long as the nominal
sender's keys have been registered. That is, if a party P has registered their public keys with
the registration authority, then whenever the adversary creates a ciphertext ostensibly from P
it will also know the plaintext. However, we require that our scheme tolerate the corruption of
the trusted third party in that it remain chosen-ciphertext secure even when the registration
authority is subverted by the adversary.
We explain this new model and definition at length in Section 3.1. We also provide an imple-
mentation for this new definition (Section 3.3) which is conceptually simple and relies only on
general assumptions. That is, it only assumes other standard cryptographic definitions and
does not rely upon particular intractability assumptions. In fact, this scheme can be thought
of as a slight variant to the first known implementation of chosen-ciphertext security [59].
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* Lastly, we begin to look beyond the standard Dolev-Yao model. As is typically presented,
the Dolev-Yao model contains only one operator which is cryptographic in nature: encryption.
There exist variants in the literature that contain operators for signatures and hashing, as well.
However, the most popular protocols in real-world practice are not captured by these, and will
not until the Dolev-Yao model is expanded to include the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme.
However, this is more easily said than done. As opposed to encryption and signing, for example,
the Diffie-Hellman scheme is not an abstract definition but a specific number-theoretic algo-
rithm. The security of this scheme depends, in turn, upon a specific computational assumption.
The issue here is not whether an established formal model can be made computationally sound,
but how best to reflect a computational assumption in a formal setting. The Diffie-Hellman
scheme relies upon a non-free operation, as opposed to the traditionally free Dolev-Yao alge-
bra. Also, it is not immediately clear what the powers of the formal adversary should be-any
efficient computation is possible.
We consider these issues at length in Chapter 4. In particular, we formulate a reasonable way
to express the Diffie-Hellman scheme in the Dolev-Yao framework (Definition 34). We also
consider the issues of non-freeness that are inevitably raised, and show how to represent the
opportunities they present to the adversary (Definition 37).
We then show how the Diffie-Hellman assumption (which provides security to the similarly-
named key-agreement scheme) can be represented in the Dolev-Yao model. This property
(Condition DN, Definition 40) is strong enough to enable proofs in the Dolev-Yao model. We
also show that if there exists a Dolev-Yao execution that violates it, there exists an adversary
that can violate the (computational) Diffie-Hellman assumption.
However, this is not enough to guarantee computational soundness. The adversary so produced
may not be efficient in its execution, and thus would not violate the Diffie-Hellman assumption.
This possibility results from the fact that protocols in the Dolev-Yao model do not a priori
need to be efficiently executable. Thus, the execution of the Dolev-Yao protocol may not be
efficiently executable either.
We resolve this by considering only the sub-class of "silent" Dolev-Yao protocols (Defini-
tion 41). In these protocols, honest participants do not use the secret Diffie-Hellman values as
plaintexts, but only as keys. We show that these protocols must be efficiently executable if the
underlying cryptographic algorithms are sufficiently strong. In fact, we use the same strong
computational assumption that enabled Theorem 1: the random oracle. If the random oracle
exists, we show that condition DE) is computationally sound for silent Dolev-Yao protocols.
(Just as the random oracle will be removed from Theorem 1 in Chapters 2 and 3.1, we will
consider in Section 5.3 possible ways by which it could be removed from this result also.)
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Chapter 2
Stronger Dolev-Yao Properties
In this section, we strengthen the result of [30] in two important ways:
" We strengthen the computational interpretation of the Dolev-Yao model beyond that contained
in Definition 7. In particular, we propose two new notions of Dolev-Yao non-malleability.
Whereas weak Dolev-Yao non-malleability considered the probability that the adversary can
create a given, fixed message, our new notions consider the probability that the adversary can
create any message. The first of these notions (finite Dolev- Yao non-malleability)considers the
case where the algebra has a finite number of elenents, as one would encountey in the setting or
a bounded number of participants engaging in a bounded number of protocol executions. The
second notion (infinite Dolev- Yao non-malleability considers the case of an infinite algebra,
and requires the adversary to not only produce a message but also to know which message is
created.
" We show that our new definitions can be satisfied by computational encryption strictly weaker
than plaintext-awareness. In particular, we show that both notions are satisfied by encryption
secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack (also known as chosen-ciphertext security). This
definition of security is like that of semantic security, except that the adversary has (slightly
limited) access to a decryption oracle. It does not use a trusted third party, and hence is not
susceptible to the same criticisms as plaintext-awareness.
The proof that chosen-ciphertext security satisfies strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability will first
use an indistinguishability lemma like that of Abadi and Rogaway[4], which is mildly interesting
in its own right.
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2.1 New Definitions
As mentioned above, the security property in Definition 7 concerns only the probability that the
adversary can produce some given "bad" message 11. However, what does this tell us about the
ability of the adversary to produce some bad message of its choice? The simplest approach to this
question is to use Definition 7 and a union bound. Intuitively (and in the style of Assumption 1)
the union bound tells us that:
Pr [A(S) produces an M E A \ C[S]] Pr [A(S) produces M]
MEA\CIS]
M EA\fS]
= eIA\C[S]|
Even though Definition 7 tells us that e is negligible, this is not enough to show that CIA \ C[S] I
is also negligible. In particular, there are as yet no assumptions that limit the size of JA \ C[S]1.
Consider, for example, the nonces. There is no requirement yet that the set of nonces 1Z be finite,
much less a function of the security parameter. Thus, 1Z \ lZAdv might be infinite also, as well as the
number of nonces in A \ C[S].
One can see the difficulty in another way. Recall that the encoding of a nonce is chosen uniformly
from bit-strings of length q. If there are an infinite number of nonces, then any bit-string of length
,q is guaranteed to be the encoding of an infinite number of them, including an infinite number in
R \ IRAdv (if the tape t is chosen randomly). Thus, by choosing a random string of the right length,
the adversary is guaranteed to produce the encoding of some "bad" nonce.
There are a number of ways around this difficulty. First, we can simply restrict the set of nonces,
and other aspects of the algebra, to polynomial size. If.the number of nonces is polynomial in the
security parameter, then a random bit-string will have only a negligible probability of being the
valid encoding of a nonce. To formalize:
Definition 9 Let A, be the smallest free algebra where atomic terms are of four types:
1. Names (M)
2. Nonces (R.)
3. Public keys (CPubj), and
4. Private keys (ICPriv2 )
where lZr7, KZPub,, CPriv2 7 are all of size qj, and compound terms are created via
* cncrypt : kPub x A - A
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* pair: A x A -* A
Intuitively, restricting ourselves to a finite algebra such as this is not too onerous a restriction: it
might simply reflect a bounded setting with a polynomial number of participants willing to engage
in the protocols a polynomial number of times.1 One might also expect that the number of names
be bounded by r; for the same reason, or the size of compound messages. These other restrictions
might also follow from the bounded setting, but it turns out that we will not require them in our
proofs.
If we restrict ourselves to this finite algebra, we can strengthen our notion of Dolev-Yao security
in the natural way:
Definition 10 A computational encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides strong finite Dolev-Yao non-
malleability if, when used in
VAPPT,Vfinite, acyclic S C A77
Pr[ t <- {0, 1}'
m <- A M(,,PbK' (.), PrK((-), R,(., s):
~M E A,7 \ C[S].m E supp [M]' <  neg(q)
Another way to side-step the problem is to allow the algebra to remain infinite, but to require
more from the adversary. We would like to ensure that a random guess is unlikely to be a valid
message. However, this seems difficult. So long as the encoding algorithm maps an infinite number of
formal messages to a, finite space of bit-strings, any element of that space will be the valid encoding of
some message. However, it seems reasonable to require the adversary to not only create a message,
but to also know which message it created.
To formalize this, we introduce the notion of a tag, which will serve to identify a message without
revealing the values of its components:
Definition 11 Let t (-) : A --> {0, 1}* be the function where:
" For N E M, t (N) = ("name", M(N)), where p is the function used to encode names in the
encoding mapping,
" For N E R, t (N) = ("nonce", l1(N)) where ln(N) produces a finite machine-readable label
uniquely identifying the nonce N, where l(N) is completely independent of the distribution
[N,.
" For K E ICPub, t (N) ("pubkey", lk(N)) where lk(N) produces a finite machine-readable label
uniquely identifying the key K, where lk(K) is completely independent of the distribution [K],,.
1Purely computational approaches to protocol analysis often make exactly this assumption. See [9] for an example.
28
" For K E ICPri, t (N) = ('"privkey", lk(N)) where lk(N) produces a finite machine-readable
label uniquely identifying the key K, where lk (K) is completely independent of the distribution
[K],.
" For the pair term M N, t (M N) = ('"pair", t (M), t( N))
" For the encryption term { -1}K, t (UMRK) = ( "enc", t(M), t(K))
For example, the tag of the message {A Na ,l} (the first message in the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol) would be:
t (4A Na} K) = K"enc", K"pair" ("name", p(A)) , ("nonce", 1,(Na))), ("key", lk (KB))
The tag of a message provides the message's entire parse tree, except that the leaves are replaced
with identifiers that do not reveal the true value of non-name leaves. Therefore, a tag can serve as
an identifier for a message, and the tags of two different messages will show how they relate.
To use this in our Dolev-Yao security condition, we give the adversary a set S of messages and
their tags. We require that the adversary not only produce a "bad" message M, but indicate that
it knows which message it produced by also producing M's tag:
Definition 12 A computational encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides strong infinite Dolev-Yao non-
malleability if, when used in [-]':
V APPT, Vfinite, acyclic S C A:
Pr[ t <- {,1}"'
3MEA\C[S] .7=t(M) andmcsupp[M] ] <;neg(-)
Here, the oracles Pb4, Pr- and Rt return both a value and the appropriate tag.
As in Theorem 1, we will show that both of these security conditions-finite and infinite strong
Dolev-Yao non-malleability-can be satisfied by sufficiently strong computational cryptography
(Theorem 5). However, we here address the second strengthening of Theorem 1. Instead of using
plaintext-aware encryption, we will use the more commonly accepted definition of security against
the chosen-ciphertext attack:
A computational public-key encryption scheine provides security against the chosen-ciphertext
attack2 (also written CCA-2 security in the notation of [7]) if no adversary has a chance significantly
2 See [59], which builds on the work of [52]. See also [17] for a practical implementation. Technically, we give the
definition for indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack. However, since this is provably equivalent to all
other notions of security under the chosen-ciphertext attack, we will simply use the more generic term of "security."
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Figure 2-1: The chosen-ciphertext security game
better than random of determining accurately whether a ciphertext c is the encryption of message
MO or message m1 , even if:
" the adversary chooses mo and mi itself, after seeing the given public key, and
" the adversary can access a decryption oracle both before choosing the messages and after
receiving the ciphertext in question. (The decryption oracle will not decrypt c itself, however.)
That is, the chosen-ciphertext security "game" is exactly like that of semantic security, except that
the adversary now also has almost-unlimited access to a decryption oracle (as shown in Figure 2-1).
Chosen-ciphertext security means that no adversary can win this game with probability better than
a random guess:
Definition 13 (Chosen-ciphertext security) A computational public-key encryption scheme
30
(G, E, D) provides indistinguishability under the chosen-ciphertext attack if
V PPT adversaries A
Pr[ (e, d) +- G(V);
m o ,mi + A Dl (e
i -- {0, 1};
c +-E(mi, e);
g +- AD2 H(c)
b =g ];+ neg(rn)
The oracle D1 (x) returns D(x,d), and D2 (x) returns D(x,d) if x # c and returns I otherwise. The
adversary is assumed to keep state between the two invocations. It is required that mo and m1 be of
the same length.
In this chapter, we will show that both finite and infinite strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability can
be satisfied by computational encryption satisfying chosen-ciphertext security. First, however, we
will prove a useful indistinguishability lemma.
2.2 An Indistinguishability Lemma
In this section, we consider the indistinguishability-based definitions of Dolev-Yao security originally
derived by Abadi and Rogaway [3, 4]. Intuitively, the definition of that paper describes when two
formal messages should "look" the same to the formal adversary. A formal adversary has the power
to make certain, limited deductions from formal messages; two given formal messages should "look"
the same when all possible deductions that can be made about them yield the same results. In
particular, the formal adversary of [3, 4] is assumed to be unable to distinguish between two different
encryptions (unless it has the corresponding private key or keys). For example, if the adversary of
[3, 4] has no other information, the two messages
{{A1}K2 B }K K 1  and {1{CDj}K B1} KI-
should be indistinguishable to it no matter what A, B, C and D are.
The fundamental result of Abadi and Rogaway is that if the encoding algorithm uses sufficiently
strong computational encryption, then two messages indistinguishable to the formal adversary will
encode to distributions indistinguishable to the computational adversary. Their result applies to
the case of symmetric encryption, and we will here translate it to the case of public-key encryption.
This translation will simultaneously strengthen and weaken the result. Indistinguishability in the
public-key setting requires a stronger similarity between messages than was necessary in the case
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of symmetric encryption. However, our results will be able to tolerate the presence of a previously-
absent strong decryption oracle.
Let T be a set of keys and suppose that the formal adversary can decrypt with regard to them.
Then we represent the information that such an adversary can deduce from a formal message by its
public-key pattern3 :
Definition 14 (Public-key pattern) Let T C KPub. We recursively define the function p(M, T)
to be:
" p(K,T) = K if K E K
" p(A,T) = A if A e M
* p(N,T) = N if N E R
" p(Ni N2,T) = p(NI,T) p(N 2 , T){ 4J(M,T)}K if K E T
* p({JMl,,T) =
ITM K o.w. (where TM is the type tree of M)
Then patternpk (M, T), the public-key pattern of an expression M relative to the set T, is
p(M, Cpub n C[{ M} U T]).
If S C A is a set of messages, then patternpk (S, T) is
(p(s1,C[SU T]), p(s2 ,C[SU T]),...)
where s1 , S2, ... are the elements of S is some canonical order. The base pattern of a message
M, denoted patternpk (M),- is defined to be patternpk (M,0), and patternpk (S) is defined to be
patternpk (S, 0).
The grammar/algebra for patterns is exactly that of messages, with the addition of a new kind
of leaf node: TAi DK (a "blob" of type-tree TM under key K) which represents undecipherable
encryptions. Unlike the "blobs" of the symmetric-encryption patterns of [3, 4], these "blobs" are
labeled with K and TAI. This is because computational encryption schemes do not necessarily hide
either the encrypting key or the plaintext length.
For convenience, we define a useful relationship between two patterns:
Definition 15 (Ingredient) If Al, M' are two patterns, then M is an ingredient of M', written
A,1 E M', if the parse tree of M is a sub-tree of the parse tree of M'.
3We will use "pattern" to indicate public-key pattern, as opposed to the stronger, symmetric-key definition of
"pattern" in [4].
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We note that since messages are special forms of patterns, this relationship can be applied between
two messages as well as between a message and a pattern. We also note a relationship between a
message and its pattern:
Theorem 2 If Al, M' are messages and Al' E patternpk (M), then Al' - C[MI].
Proof. Suppose that A' E patternk (M). Consider the same path from root to Al' in the parse
tree of M. Along this path, if an interior node (not itself Al') is in C[M] then both child nodes are
in C[M]:
* C[M] is closed under separation. Hence, if a node is the pair N N' and the node is in C[M],
then both N and N' are in C[M].
" The two children of a node {N K are N and K. Since K E IC Pub, K E C[M] automatically.
Furthermore, K- 1 c C[M] as well: if it were not, then this node of M's parse tree would have
been replaced with ITNK in the parse tree of patternpk (Al). But JTNDK is not a message
and will not contain M' in its parse tree. So K- 1  C[AI], and since C[M] is closed under
decryption with keys it contains, N E C[M].
Since the root of this path, M itself, is in C[M] by definition, it must be the case that every child
of every node above M' in the parse tree of M is in the set C[M]. Hence, Al' E C[M] as well. U
We can extend the encoding operation to the pattern algebra:
Definition 16 (Encoding: patterns) Let:
M [ l' be any fixed bit-string of length [M such as the all-zero string, and
* [ M K]' be the the mapping from distributions to distributions given by
(E ([ MD] , [K]' , [K]' , "enc" .
Patterns allow us to state when two messages appear to be the same to the formal adversary:
when they have the same pattern. The standard definition of 'appears to be the same' in the world
of computational encryption is that of computational indistinguishability. We present a more general
definition, which incorporates the possibility of an oracle:
Definition 17 (Computational indistinguishability) Suppose that {D,} and {D'} are two
families of distributions indexed by the security parameter. Then they are computationally indistin-
guishable with respect to a family of oracles 0, written Dn -o. D', if
V PPT adversaries A:
Pr[d - D, : 1 <- AO" " (d, 1'7)] - Pr[d <- D:1 +- AO " (d, 177)] < neqi()
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We note that if no oracle access is granted at all, then the above definition reduces to the standard
notion of computational indistinguishability.
Our intuitive notion is that a message and its pattern should appear to be the same. We formalize
this notion by saying that a message and its pattern should encode to computationally indistinguish-
able probability distributions. To make this formalization completely meaningful, however, we must
consider what oracle (if any) the adversary can access. This will be determined by the oracles allowed
by the underlying computational encryption scheme.
We will assume that the encoding mapping uses CCA-2 secure cryptography. Thus, the oracle
we will use in Definition 17-to show that a message and its pattern produce indistinguishable
encodings-will exactly mirror the decryption oracles of Definition 13. Those oracles will decrypt,
with respect to a given public key, anything but a given "challenge" ciphertext. Our oracles will
do the same. However, a message and its pattern can be thought of as possibly many different
"challenge" ciphertexts under possibly many different keys. It is simple to define the keys with
respect to which our oracles will decrypt:
Definition 18 Let M be a pattern. Then MKP,, = {K E kPub : K E M}. If S is a set of mes-
sages, then SiP,.b = {K E lCPub : 3M E S s. t. K E M}.
In addition, the oracle may decrypt with respect to additional keys in some set T. (We use this
additional flexibility in the proof of our main theorem.) Due to efficiency concerns, however, the set
T must be finite.
It is more difficult to define the "challenge" ciphertexts which our oracle will not decrypt. Most
directly, they are those encryptions which differ between [M]t and [patternk (M, T)j. That is, the
challenge ciphertexts should be those which correspond to "blobs" in the pattern of M relative to
the set of keys T. However, for convenience, we will define a larger but equivalent set of challenge
ciphertexts which correspond not only to the "blobs" but all encryptions visible in M to a Dolev-Yao
adversary.
Definition 19 (Visible) Let o- be a bit-string, and r a set of computational public keys. Then let
vis, (c) be the smallest set so that
* -E vis, (a),
" if (a, b, "pair") G vis, (or), then a E vis, (a) and b E vis, (a),
" if (c, k, "enc") E vis, (a), k E 7, and k' is the secret key corresponding to k, then D(c, k') E
vis, (a), and
" if (c, k, "enc") C vis, (a), (k', "privkey") e vis, (a), and k' is the secret key corresponding to
k, then D(c,k') E vis , (a).
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A bit-string ?n is a visible element in a relative to T if m G vis, (a).
Intuitively, x E visT (a) iff x is an encoding of X, a is an encoding of M, T is an encoding of T and
X E pattern~k (M, T). That is, a bit-string is a visible element of a if the adversary can derive it
from a using only Dolev-Yao-style operations using a and keys in T. The set vis, (a) contains every
ciphertext which corresponds to a "blob" in patternpk (M, T). However, it also contains every other
ciphertext that has an corresponding analogue in patternpk (Al, T). The decryption oracle will not
decrypt these, but this is not worrisome: the computational adversary can decrypt these "non-blobs"
itself. Just as these encryptions are not "blobbed" in patternpk (M, T) because the required formal
private key is in T or derivable from M, the adversary can decrypt the corresponding computational
ciphertext from keys in -r or derivable from a itself. Thus, we can prohibit the decryption of this
more general set without losing generality.
Now that we know the nature of our decryption oracle, we can finally define our indistinguisha-
bility property between messages and their patterns:
Definition 20 (Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability) A computational encryption
scheme provides Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability if, when used in [.It, for all acyclic formal
messages M and finite T C KPub:
M], MT [pattern k (M, T)I
where O"'T"(x, e) returns I unless e is a valid public key and
* either e e [KI, for some K E T, or
* e E [K]' for some K E (M|1CP., \ T) and x is not in vis[TIt (d).
(The tape t is assumed to be consistent with that used to form the sample from [patternk (M, T)]
or [M],.) In these cases, OA'0 A(x, e) returns D(x,d ) where d is the private key corresponding to e.
In the next section, we will show that Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability implies Dolev-Yao
weak non-malleability. Before this, however, we show that Dolev-Yao public-key indistinguishability
can be satisfied by CCA-2 security.
Theorem 3 If the public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D) provides indistinguishability under the
chosen-ciphertext attack, (G, E, D) provides Dolev- Yao public-key indistinguishability.
Proof.
Suppose that the encoding mapping uses a computational encryption scheme (G, E, D). Further,
suppose that there exists a formal message M, a set of keys T and a PPT adversary A that can
distinguish between a sample from [A]f, and a sample from [patternk (l, T)] (given access to the
oracle in Definition 20). Then (G, E, D) does not satisfy CCA-2 security.
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We prove this by hybrid argument. Since M is acyclic, we can order the key-pairs used in the
parse tree of A1 as K 1, K 2 ... Kk so that if Ki - K in the graph G , then i > j. That is, the
deeper the key in the encryptions, the smaller the number.
We go about the hybrid argument by constructing a number of intermediate patterns between
M and patternpk (AY, T). In particular, we construct patterns A10 , A11,. . . Mk such that:
* Mo= M = patternpk (M, T U {KT1 ,K2 k, ... )
SMi = patternpk (M,T U { K-_\, K-2, K- 1}), and
" Ak patternpk (M, T).
That is, between Mi and Ali+ we pick a key K and replace all encryptions with that key with
blobs of the appropriate length.
We use this typeface for a running example. Suppose
M = {IAI}K {K-1 1 1}K2 {IBK3 {A B1}K 2
and
T = {K 3 , K 4 }
Assume for now that AZAdv 0. The pattern of M is
patternpk (M, T) = IM IKPri D K 2 {|BI}K 3 I MA A K 2
By using the order on keys suggested by the notation, we can let
Mo= M = {IA } {K }K {BI}K1 {KA B}K 2
M1= MKI {K 1 }K 2  {|BI}K3  {IA B1}K 2
A/ 2  = M (CPrHV)K 2  {|B1}K (IM MDK 2
M3  = (JM[DK I JCPriv )K 2  {lBI}K 3  ( M DK2
M 4  = M j I ICPrivDK {B}K (M A K 2
We will use the hybrid argument on this table.
Now, suppose that the distributions [M], and [patternpk (M, T)] -the top and bottoms rows
of our table-are distinguishable. That is, [M, OAIT [patternpk (M, T)] . Then we know by a
(standard) hybrid argument that two consecutive rows are also distinguishable. 4 We continue the
4 This only follows if the number of rows in the table is polynomial in the security parameter. In this case, however,
the number of rows in the table is constant with respect to r7.
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hybrid argument by creating a new table between the two distinguishable rows. Suppose that Ki is
the key being "blobbed" between the two rows. Then there are a fixed number of encryptions being
converted to "blobs". Create a row for each such encryption, so that two consecutive rows differ
only in a single encryption being replaced with a blob.
For example, if the two rows are
MI = KM I K {K 11}K2 {IB1}K3 {JA B}K2
and
M2 =M K, 'IPriJK2 {B}K MMDK2
Then we could expand this into the table:
M1 = gMfK, {K 1 }K2 {1BI}K 3  {IA B1}K 2
M 1.5 = lM pK , 'KlCPHriK 2 JBI}K3 {IAB1}K 2
12 = IM K, JKCPrivK2 4BI}K, IMAMDK 2
Two of these rows must be distinguishable.
Again, there must exist two consecutive rows R1 and R 2 that can be distinguished. Since the rows
differ only in the contents of a single encryption and every other part of the row can be created
independently, distinguishing between the encoding of two rows reduces to distinguishing between
two encryptions.
Let A be the adversary that can distinguish between the two rows, and let E = {P|}K be the
encryption that is being changed into JTppK. Then to break the CCA-2 security of the encryption
scheme we will distinguish between an encryption of mo and ml under public key e by:
* letting mo <- [P]7,
* letting mli <- [gTp D] , and
" treating e as the encoding of K.
More formally:
* On input e, select random t +- {o, 1}'. Then draw p <- [P]t [e/K], where [M]$l [x/X, y/Y,...]
is the same as [M]I except that x is assumed to be the value for X, y the value for Y, and
so on. (If X is an encryption and occurs more than once, then x is used as the value for the
instance of X indicated by context. Values for the other instances are still drawn as before.)
Note that because M is acyclic, we do not need to know the value [K1]I to draw from [P].
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Return p and [Tp D, as candidate plaintexts. (Recall that [JTp ] is a fixed string of the
appropriate length, such as the all-zero string.)
o On input c, an encryption of either [ TpD]' or p, sample s <- [RI]t [c/Pe/K]. Note that,
since both t and e were selected randomly, [R 1 ] [c/P, e/K] is the same distribution as [R1], if
c encrypts p. Similarly, [R1] [c/P, e/K] is the same distribution as [R2], if c encrypts [ Tp jt
Feed (s, 1) to A.
o If A makes an oracle call on (x, e), we check that e = [Ko] for some Ko E Mrcp,, U T. If not,
we return I. If so, we decrypt or not as follows:
- If Ko = K, we check that x is not visible in x relative to t = [Ti . Since x is not visible
in s relative to t, and c is visible in s relative to t, x - c. Hence, the decryption oracle
D2 in Definition 13 will happily decrypt x for us.
- If Ko # K, we can produce [K-1 '], ourselves from the tape t. If KO E T, we decrypt x
with the value so produced. If KO C MjC;,, \ T, we also check to see if x is visible in s
relative to t. We return I if it is, and decrypt x if it is not.
Assume in our example that rows M 1.5 and M 2 can be distinguished by A. Then P = A B
and K = K 2 . We build the two candidate ciphertexts by selecting t <- {0, }'. We then
select p -- [A B]t , and return p, [IM M D] as candidate ciphertexts. When we get c, a
value either from [(M M K2 ]t or [{|AB|Kd2 t] , we draw
s +- [L1MLbKICyriV DK2 {IBl}K3 {IAB}K 2]t [c/{A B1}K 2 , e/K 2]
Since either s G supp [Af 1 .5] or s E supp [M 2]t , the adversary A will tell us which one,
and this answer will tell us if c encrypts [A B]j or [IM M D.'
We simulate A on s: when A requests that we decrypt a string x with [K- 1 ] t,, we make
sure that it isn't c, [B]t , or the bit-strings in s that represent (JM K, and 1CPriDK2
If it is not these four things, we use the tape t to create the secret key and decrypt x.If
A asks us to decrypt something with [K 1] , we check that it is not any of the four
ciphertexts above. If it is not, then we send it to the decryption oracle provided to us
in Definition 13, which will decrypt it for us. If A asks us to decrypt with [K{1 ] or
[KZ 1], we create the keys from the tape and decrypt any ciphertext.
The answer from A directly corresponds to the plaintext chosen for c, which allows us to
distinguish whether it encrypts [(|M M j or P.
A(s, rq) will eventually return an answer that distinguishes between samples from R1 and R2 . The
answer from A will signify whether c encrypted p or [ T D.7 .
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We note as a corollary that the exact analogue of the Abadi-Rogaway result holds: if two messages
Al and N have the same pattern (with respect to some set T) then they produce indistinguishable
encodings:
Corollary 4 Suppose that Al, N are two acyclic messages, T C A is a set of keys, and Al1c,
NJKK . If patternpk (Al, T) = patternpk (N, T), then [MA], OAl.T [N],.
Proof. By assumption and Theorem 20, we know that
[M|, OAIT [patternpk (M, T)] = [patternpk (N, T)] 7a N [N 7
Since Mpc,, = Njc,, and patternpk (M, T) = patternpk (N, T), the oracle OMT is the same as
the oracle ONT. The e A, T relation is transitive (by hybrid argument), and so the result follows. *
We end by noting that we do not lose generality in this corollary by requiring that AlIKPb
NKpub. If M and N have the same pattern but have different public keys in their parse trees, then
we can simply form M' by pairing with AT every key in MIKPb U NIpCb, and similarly for N'.
Since we add only public keys, patternpk (Al', T) = patternpk (N', T). However, it is now the case
that M'JKPub = N' IKPab and the corollary holds.
2.3 Strong Dolev-Yao Non-Malleability
Theorem 5 Suppose that (G, E, D) is a computational public-key encryption scheme that provides
Dolev- Yao public-key indistinguishability. Then (G, E, D) provides both finite and infinite strong
Dolev- Yao non-malleability.
Proof.
Suppose that the theorem is false. Then there is an adversary that is able to produce a message
outside the closure of its input set. In the finite case:
3 APPT, ]finite, acyclic S C A7, E polynomial q, for infinitely many r:
Pr[ t <{0, 1}
m -AM1 (.),PbK' (.),PrK' (.),R" (-( 8 ):
3M E A,\ C[S] .m E supp [All |>
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In the infinite case:
3 APPT, 3 finite, acyclic S C A, 3 polynomial q, for infinitely many q/:
Pr[ t<- {0,1}w
S <- [3] ;
m, < M (),PbK (.),PrK(-),R (.)(17, S, t (S))
]M E A \ C[S] .T = t (M) and rn E supp [Mli >
In each of these cases, we will construct from the counter-example adversary a new adversary A1
that serves as a counter-example to Theorem 20. But first, consider the parse tree of M. Suppose
that every path from the root of the parse tree to a leaf passes through an element of C[S]. Then it
must be that the root message, M, is in C[S] - a contradiction. Hence, there must be some path
in the parse tree of Al such that no element along that path is in C[S], including the leaf AMl.
Now, consider the simple, intermediate adversary A2, which operates as follows:
1. It first chooses a random tape t <- {0, 1}.
2. It then uses that tape to sample s <- [SJ].
3. It simulates the counter-example adversary A on input (1', s).
4. When A makes an oracle query, A2 responds appropriately. (Because it knows the random tape
t, it can compute any atomic value it wishes, including those returned by the oracles.)
5. When A responds with m E supp [MII, A2 uses this to produce a value mi E [Ai] . That is, it
progresses down the path in the parse tree of M that leads to MI:
" It starts with a value for [A/I , and at the root of the parse tree.
* If the current node is a pair, M'N', then it separates the current bit-string value into
[M' and [N']t. It progresses down the path in the parse tree toward AMi, and keeps the
value for the new node as its new current value.
" If the current node is an encryption, JM'}K, it uses the tape t to find the value for
[K1]t. It then uses that to decrypt the current bit-string value to get [M]', and
progresses down the path in the parse tree toward M. (Note: we know that Ah cannot
be K, since K E C[S] and we know this to not be the case for 1 .)
At the end, this adversary will have a value for [M 1J(. Now, consider what All might be:
" Al 1 cannot be a compound term, since it is a leaf of the parse tree.
" Suppose Al E M. Then 1 1 E C[S], no matter what S is-a contradiction.
" Suppose A! l G CPub. Then, as mentioned above, Al E C[S] always.
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" Suppose M, E R. If M e lZAdv then Mi E C[S]. So, we only need to worry about M1 E
R \ RAd,. There are two cases: either Ml is in the parse tree of something in S, or it is not.
The second case leads to a contradiction. If Al is not in the parse tree of any element of S,
then the input to the adversary is completely independent of the output. Thus, the adversary
in question is able to produce a j-bit value which happens to be the encoding of a nonce M. If
we are discussing the setting of finite strong Dolev-Yao non-malleability, then there are only 7
nonces, and the probability that the adversary can guess the encoding of one is bounded above
by g. Thus, the adversary cannot produce a nonce not in S with non-negligible probability.
If, on the other hand, we are in the infinite setting, then the adversary must have also produced
a tag T. Since t = t (M), one can recover t (MI) by descending the parse tree of -r. Thus, the
adversary is able to recover the encoding of one particular nonce, M, which has a random
rj-bit encoding. Again, the adversary cannot do this with non-negligible probability. Thus, in
neither case can it be with non-negligible probability that M is in R \ RAd, but not in the
parse tree of anything in S.
* Suppose M E kPriv. Then, we proceed similar to above. If M E CAd, then M E C[S]. If
M1 E KPriv \KZAdv but not in the parse tree of some element of S, the adversary is able to guess
a private key based on the corresponding public key, possibly encryptions using the public key,
and values independent of the private key. Since we are assuming that the encryption scheme
provides indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks, the probability of this must be
negligible. Again, we find a contradiction.
Thus, the only possibility that occurs with non-negligible probability is that MI is in R \ RAdv
or in ICPriv \ KAdv, and that M is in the parse tree of some element of S. However, it cannot be the
case that MI itself is in S, or that M1 can be produced from S only by separating pairs. (If either
of those were true, then M1 would be in C[S] itself, a contradiction.) Thus, Ml must only appear in
S in the plaintext of encryptions.
Thus, we have an adversary A2 which takes an element of [S]' and produces the plaintext to
some encryption in S. Granted, A2 created [S] itself and knows every secret. Hence A2 does not
serve as the counter-example to anything. However, a simple modification to A2 will serve as a
counterexample to Theorem 20. Let:
S'= SUSI if M R
S U {{Np1}K : K E SIc,} (where N, E lZAdV) if M E KPriv
Then we will be able to distinguish between [S']j and [patternk (5', T)] where T is M \
(Note that if All is a private key, then it is in neither C[S] or T. Hence the encryption {Np|}Al-1
will become (J i in patternpk (A, T).)
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Consider the adversary A1 that does the following:
1. It receives as input the value d, which is drawn either from [S'' or from [patternk (S', T)]
(for some tape t). It separates d into ds and dtet, where ds c [S]t and either dA1, E [MI if
All is a nonce, or d, E JN,, {INp1}AI-1 J or E{Np, R) , 1  if Al1 is a private key.
2. It simulates A on (1, ds). (We will postpone consideration of any oracle calls that A makes
for one moment.)
3. When A returns m (and r if we are in the infinite case) A, will attempt to extract the value
[Mit from m. That is, it recurses down the parse tree of M to NM1, separating pairs and
decrypting encryptions, until it arrives at M1 . If we are in the infinite setting, then the tag r
will provide the path to M,. If we are in the finite setting, then we simply go down every path
until we reach the leaf or we are halted:
" If Al = N N 2 and m = (ni, n 2, "pair"), then A continues recursively on nil or n 2 or both.
* If M= {INI}K, n = (c, k, "enc") and k E [K] , then A, sends (c, k) to the decryption
oracle. Will the decryption oracle decrypt? If not, we halt. But along the path to M1 , it
must. There are two cases:
- By definition, K E MjCr,. If K SKI,b also, then K c T. Hence, the oracle of
Defintion 20 will decrypt c.
- If K c SjKP, , then K E SrPb,\(MjKPb \ SIKP.). But SKPb\(M P,b \ S11C.b) =
SJKP, \ T. Hence, the decryption oracle of Definition 20 will decrypt c if c is not
in vis[Tjt (d). However, could c be visible in d with respect to [T] ? If it is, then
by the definition of visibility, {NI}K E patternpk (S, T). In this case, however,
T = M , \ S/c,,, and so contains no keys in the parse tree of S. Allowing
the adversary to decrypt with respect to T does not give it more information about
S. Hence, patternpk (S, T) = patternpk (S). Thus, if {|NI}K ; patternpk (S, T) then
{NI}K E patternpk (S) and so by Theorem 2 it must be that {INi}K E C[S]. How-
ever, this contradicts the assumption that no node on the path from M to M, is in
C[S], and so c cannot be visible in d. Hence, the decryption oracle of Definition 20
will decrypt it.
Thus, the decryption oracle will always return p, the plaintext of c. A1 then moves down
the parse tree to the node for N and recursively applies this process to p.
4. If we fail to reach a leaf All which is not in the closure, then A immediately stops and outputs
0. Otherwise, A, will acquire a value mi which may be the encoding of M. A, tests this using
the string dtest, which it reserved at the beginning. If All is a nonce, then dtet will contain
the value for 1 ; A can simply test that mi is a substring of dtest. If Al1 is a private key, then
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dtest contains an encryption of a known plaintext [Np] under the corresponding public key.
A1 simply decrypts each encryption with mi. One of the results should be the same as [NV] .
If these tests are satisfied, then A1 outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
A1 will return 1 whenever A produces an element of supp [M1$. Hence, A1 will return 1 with
probability at least q given that d is in fact drawn from [S],. If, on the other hand, d is drawn
from [patternk (M, T)] , then A cannot have a non-negligible chance of producing a m E supp [M]1
for any M E A \ C[S] (or A, \ C[S] in the finite case). Since Mi 1 C[S], it cannot be that
Al E patternpk (S) = patternpk (S, T).
* If All is a nonce, then this implies that the sample d will be entirely independent of the actual
value for [Mi]t.
o If Mi is a private key, on the other hand, then d may include encryptions made using the
public key f[Mi] . But the encryption provides indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext
attack, so it is infeasible to recover a private key using only encryptions under the corresponding
public key. Since d is otherwise independent of [M,]), A cannot have a non-negligible chance
of recovering [M,],
Thus, the probability that A1 will return 1 given that d is sampled from [patternpk (S, T)] must be
bounded above by either:
" The probability of guessing some nonce or private key, in the finite setting, or
" The probability of guessing the particular nonce or private key indicated by the tag, in the
infinite setting.
In both of these cases, the probability of a successful guess must be negligible.
Hence, if A has a non-neg-ligible chance of constructing ?n E supp [M]' from a sample from [S]t, for
any M § C[S], then A1 has a non-negligible chance of distinguishing [S'], from [patternk (8', T)],
a contradiction of Theorem 20.
There remains only one last complication: A has access to oracles while operating. In particular,
A can request any public key, any private key in KAdV, any identifier, and any nonce in R-Adv. How
does A1 respond to these oracle calls when it simulates A?
The answer is that we slightly modify the set S' to include the information needed to respond.
In particular, let Slk,V, and SIRAd, be defined analogously to SjK,, .Then the set S' is will actually
be { S U S|',0 U SI)CAd, U SRA& U{M1 iAf All C R
S U Slu U SICAdx,, U SRAd, U { N,, {|N|}A if Mi C kPriv
When A1 receives the input d it strips off ds as before and simulates A. When A makes an oracle
call, however, A, can respond:
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" If the oracle is being asked for an identifier, A1 computes the representation of that identifier.
(As mentioned before, we assume that the encoding of identifiers is efficiently computable.)
* If the oracle is being called on an ingredient of S, then the additional information in s contains
the needed bit-string.
" Otherwise, the needed value is a random variable independent of d. A, can sample from the
relevant distribution to produce an indistinguishable value. It then stores the value for future
use (and if the value is a key, the corresponding secret or public key also), and returns it.
Since the formal messages we added to S' are already in C[S], they do not change the pattern of
the original S. Hence, adding them to S' does not change the distribution of ds, and A will progress
as before.
Thus, both of our stronger formalizations of the Dolev-Yao assumption can be satisfied by stan-
dard, known definitions of computational security. Thus, the results of [30] are no longer hindered
by the criticisms of plaintext-aware encryption. In the next chapter, however, we address these
criticisms directly by proposing a new definition (and implementation) of plaintext awareness itself.
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Chapter 3
Plaintext Awareness via Key
Registration
As stated above, an encryption scheme is plaintext-aware if, whenever an adversary creates a cipher-
text, it must "know" its corresponding plaintext. However, existing definitions of plaintext-awareness
have been rightfully criticized for their reliance upon the existence and the trustworthiness of the
random oracle. In this chapter, we discuss our work in this area [31] which demonstrates that this
criticism applies only to the original- definitions, not the underlying notion. In particular, we put
forth two main contributions: a new definition and an implementation.
1. As opposed to previous definitions, our definition of plaintext-aware encryption does not use
the random oracle. We still need a trusted third party, but our party is much more natural
(being already used in practice), much less trusted, and is used only once rather than at every
encryption.
2. Our implementation is a self-referential variation on an earlier, well-known encryption scheme
due to Sahai [59]. In particular, our variation will require the sender to encrypt messages in
its own keys as well as those of the intended sender. Strong cryptographic primitives called
zero-knowledge proofs will prove to the receiver that the sender performed this action and that
the sender knows his or her own private keys. Thus, the receiver can know that the sender is
able to decrypt any ciphertext that it creates.
3.1 A New Definition of Plaintext Awareness
Our new definition requires a particular model for public-key encryption: All users will have either
or both of a receiving key-pair and a sending key-pair. Furthermore users are assumed to registered
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their public sending keys with a trusted registration authority. Lastly, we make a new assumption
about the adversary: that it is history-preserving, meaning that it records and never erases its input
and internal coin-flips.
However, these are not radical changes. Firstly, users already have two key-pairs: one for signing
messages (which corresponds to the sending key-pair) and one to decrypt messages sent to them (the
receiving key-pair). Furthermore, a trusted registration authority is essentially already implicit in
any actual implementation of public-key encryption. Such implementations enforce an association
between users and public keys by requiring that users register their public key with a certification
authority. These authorities verify the identity of the applicant and that the applicant knows the
corresponding secret key. It is natural, therefore, to assume the existence of a trusted third party
for key registration. Lastly, it is not unreasonable to expect the adversary to record its input and
coin-flips: we do not weaken the abilities of the adversary by prohibiting erasures.
Our definition of plaintext awareness requires that the adversary know the plaintext to any
ciphertext it creates, provided the (apparent) sender has registered its sending key with an honest
registration authority. In particular, there should exist an extractor which can, given that a successful
registration had previously occurred,- predict the output of the receiver's decryption algorithm.
However, the addition of a trusted authority should only strengthen the security of the scheme, not
weaken it. Our definitions, therefore, require that the scheme should remain CCA-2 secure (i.e., the
most secure as is possible without a trusted third party) even if the registration authority is itself
corrupt.
Our new definitions serve as yet another example of one of the grand paradigms of cryptography:
if one wishes a protocol or primitive P to have some property, it can often be achieved by adding a
set-up phase that provides P. For example, one can achieve secrecy of communication by engaging
in a set-up phase in which a secret key is exchanged. Also, authentication in the retrieval stage for
A's public key later allows the authentication of messages from A.
In this chapter, we wish to add to public-key encryption the property of plaintext-awareness, or
knowledge of the plaintext. Therefore, our definitions add a set-up phase to asymmetric encryption,
and our implementation will use during this phase a protocol that achieves knowledge. In particu-
lar, we will use an (interactive) proof of knowledge protocol at set-up to achieve (non-interactive)
plaintext knowledge for later encryptions.
3.1.1 Preliminaries
We say that an algorithm or interactive TM A is history-preserving if it "never forgets" anything.
As soon as it flips a coin or receives an input or a message, A writes it on a separate history tape that
is write-only and whose head always moves from left to right. The history tape's content coincides
with A's internal configuration before A executes any step.
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If A is an history-preserving algorithm and it A appears more than once in a piece of GMR
notation (e.g, Pr[. . . ; a <- A(x); ... ; b +- A(y); . .. : p(. - -, a, b, - - -)]) then the history and state of A
is preserved from the end of one "use" to the beginning of the next.
The notation h 4-" A indicates that h is the current content of A's history tape.
We assume the adversary to be an efficient (probabilistic polynomial-time) history-preserving
algorithm (interactive TM).
Following [26], we consider a two-party protocol as a pair, (A, B), of interactive Turing machines.
By convention, A takes input (x, rA) and B takes input (y, rB) where x and y are arbitrary and
rA and rB are random tapes. On these inputs, protocol (A, B) computes in a sequence of rounds,
alternating between A-rounds and B-rounds. In an A-round only A is active and sends a message
(i.e., a string) that will become an available input to B in the next B-round. (Likewise for B-rounds.)
A computation of (A, B) ends in a B-round in which B sends the empty message and both A and
B compute a private output.
Letting E be an execution of protocol (A, B) on input (x, y) and random input (rA, rB), we make
the following definitions:
" The transcript of E consists of the sequence of messages exchanged by A and B, and is denoted
by TRANSA'B (x,rAjy,rB);
" The view of A in execution E consists of the triplet (x, TA, t), where t is E's transcript, and is
denoted by VIEWAB (x, rA Iy, rB);
" The view of B consists of the triplet (y, rB, t), where t is E's transcript, and is denoted by
VI EWAB (x, rA y, rB);
* If E is an execution of (A, B) on inputs (x, rA) and (y, rB) then the output of A in E, denoted
OUT ,B (x, rA y, TB), consists of the string z output by A after the last round. Similarly,
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OUTA,B (x, TA jy, rB) is the output of B in the same execution.
" We also define the random distribution OUT (x, -ly,.) to be OUTAB (x, rAIy, rB) where rA
and rB are selected randomly, and similarly for OUTA,B (x, _y,)
We say that an execution of a protocol (A, B) has security parameter 77 if the private input of A
is of the form (1'7, x') and the private (non-random) input of B is of the form (1", y').
3.1.2 Formal Definitions
A registration-based plaintext-aware encryption scheme consists of a registration protocol (RU,
RA)and a public-key encryption scheme (G, E, D), where:
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" (RU, RA) is the two-party protocol in which the sender keys are generated and registered. The
registration authority RA should output es, the public key of the sender. The registering user
RU output both e, and d8, the public and private keys for the sender. After a successful run
of the protocol, one can imagine the public sending key is inserted in a public file or that the
user is given a certificate, but the precise mechanism of publication is irrelevant here. What
is crucial, however, is that the registration protocol be a secure atomic operation. That is, we
can think of it as being run one user at a time, in person, and from beginning to end.1
It is worth noting that either RU or RA may reject in the registration protocol (presumably
when the other party is dishonest), in which case we assume the output is _. For ease in the
definitions, we assume that if _ is any input to either E or D, the output will also be _ or
(1, I) as appropriate.
" (G, E, D) is a public-key encryption scheme, where:
- G(1") produces (er, dr), a key pair for the receiver,
- E(rn, er, d,) produces a ciphertext c, where ?n is the message to encrypt, e, is the receiver's
public key, and d, is the sender's private key. (We assume without loss of generality that
a private key also contains the corresponding public key.) The ciphertext c is assumed to
explicitly indicate which public keys were used in its creation.
- D(c, dr, es) produces m, a message, where c is the ciphertext to decrypt, d, is the receiver's
private key, and e, is the sender's public key. Note that this algorithm takes both the
receiver's private receiving key and the sender's public sending key. If the ciphertext is
invalid, the output is I.
The protocol (RU, RA) and the encryption scheme (G, E, D) must satisfy the following conditions:
Registration Completeness. The key registration protocol between an honest registrant and
an honest registration authority will almost always be successful. Furthermore, the user and the
authority will agree on the public key.
Pr[ r, <- {0, 1}*; r 2  0, 1}*;
(e., d,) <- 0 U T ,RA (I, ri l11,T2
e' <-- OUT R,RA (17,r n 2):
es = e'# ]1 -neg(71)
'Without this assumption, we would have to worry about man-in-the-middle, concurrency and other types of
attacks which will obscure both the definitional and implementation aspects of our model.
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As in the chosen-ciphertext game, the adversary cannot send the challenge ciphertext c to the
decryption oracle D. (Not shown: transmission of d, from D to T.)
Figure 3-1: The honest security game
Encryption Completeness. If an honest sender encrypts a message n into a ciphertext c, then
the honest recipient will almost always decrypt c into m.
VM E {O, 1}1
Pr[ (e,,d) <- OUT R,RA (117,
(er, dr) - (1);
c <-- E(m, er, d,);
9 <- D(c, dr, e,)
g=m ] ;> 1 - neg(rj)
Honest Security. If recipient and sender are honest, then the encryption is adaptively chosen-
ciphertext secure even if the adversary controls the registration authority. Note that the definition
of chosen-ciphertext security use here differs from Definition 13 in two ways. (Contrast the original
chosen-ciphertext "game" of Figure 2-1 with the new honest-security "game" of the key-registration
setting in Figure 3-1.) First, the encryption and decryption algorithms now use keys of both sender
and receiver. More importantly, however, the adversary now also has access to an encryption oracle.
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Definition 13 allows the adversary to have arbitrary ciphertexts decrypted by a decryption oracle.
The corresponding encryption oracle was not needed: if the encryption algorithm used only public
keys, the adversary can encrypt on its own. Now that encryption may require the sender's private
key, however, we need to provide access to an encryption oracle explicitly:
V oracle-calling adversaries A
Pr[ (dr, er) <- G(1P);
(es, d,) <-OUT R 14 -19 -
mo, 771 - AE(-,r-,)D(-,d,-)(er, es);
b - {0, 1};
c - E(mb,er, ds);
g A
b =g ] ;i+ neg (7)
where
* mo and m, have the same length,
* E(-, -, d,) is the oracle that returns E(m', e,, d,) on input (m', e').
* D(-,d,-) is the oracle that returns D(n', dr, e') on input (n', e').
" D(-, dr,-) - {c, e,} is the oracle that on input (c', e') returns D(c', dr, e') if c' # c or e' e,
and returns I otherwise.
If the input to any of these oracles includes I, then the output will also be I. Also, recall that
the adversary is assumed to be history-preserving, so that it 'remembers' es and er from the first
invocation.
Plaintext Awareness. If the registration authority is honest and player X (either the adversary
or an honest player) registers a key, then the adversary can decrypt any string it sends to an honest
participant ostensibly encrypted by X. More specifically, there exists an extractor that can determine
the result of the recipient's decryption algorithm without access to the recipient's private key. As
mentioned in Section 1.6, the ciphertext alone cannot contain enough information to enable this ex-
traction without violating the semantic (and hence chosen-ciphertext) security of the scheme. Thus,
the extractor needs access to some additional information. In the original definition of plaintext-
awareness, this additional information was a list of the queries made by the adversary to the random
oracle. These queries presented an opportunity to see the internal state of the adversary. Since this
opportunity is no longer present, we will use as our additional information the adversary's state
directly-as represented by its history tape.
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In our implementation, the extractor will use this history tape to simulate the adversary. That is,
the extractor is assumed to have the adversary's code 'hard-wired' into it. The order of quantifiers
below allows this: the extractor can be chosen after the adversary. However, this is not necessary:
the extractor can be chosen before the adversary if the adversary provides its own code as well as its
internal history tape. That is, our implementation will satisfy this variation as well. However, we
believe that the weaker form below to be more appropriate as the "official" definition of plaintext-
awareness.
However, in its effort to create an "undecipherable" challenge plaintext the adversary will have
access to additional information of its own. It will have access to a decryption oracle, as above. One
might also expect the adversary to have access to an encryption oracle, and in a way it will. However,
a mere encryption oracle is not sufficient. To model realistic scenarios in which our encryption scheme
may be used, we must consider the fact that the adversary may (as a result of higher-level protocols)
gain ciphertexts to which it does not know the plaintext. It may be counter-intuitive to think that
these might help the adversary in any way, but recall that the goal of the adversary is to create a
ciphertext whose plaintext is unknown to it. One must consider the possibility that the adversary
cannot do this on its own but can do so by manipulating a "valid" ciphertext (with an unknown
plaintext) from an external source.
For this reason, it is insufficient to give the adversary access only to decryption and encryption
oracles. The decryption oracle does not provide new ciphertexts, and the encryption oracle is
insufficient for two reasons:
" If the adversary merely had access to an encryption oracle, then it must "know" the plaintext
to all so-produced ciphertexts.
" Even if the above objection could be nullified (e.g., by allowing erasures) it still only allows the
adversary access to ciphertexts whose plaintexts it can generate. Suppose, for example, that a
higher-level protocol gives the adversary both a large graph and an encryption of a Hamiltonian
circuit. A mere encryption oracle would not be sufficient to simulate this scenario.
We represent the possible activity of a higher-level protocol as an "ally" PPT oracle L. When
activated, L examines the history of the adversary. It then generates any plaintext and public
receiver key that it pleases. This plaintext is then encrypted with the appropriate sending key, and
the ciphertext is given to the adversary. Note that this ally is a generalization of a simple encryption
oracle: one can imagine an ally that simply outputs as message and key the last two elements of the
adversary's history. Hence, there is no need to give access to an encryption oracle explicitly.
To summarize (see Figure 3-2) the definition of plaintext awareness requires that there exist an
extractor that can produce the plaintexts to adversarily-chosen ciphertexts, given only the ciphertext
and the adversary's history. The adversary has access to a decryption algorithm and an arbitrary
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Figure 3-2: The game of plaintext awareness via key registration
ally oracle which has its own private input. The challenge ciphertext given to the extractor cannot
be the result of a call to the ally. The extractor can depend on the choice of adversary, but must
then work for all allies:
V adversaries A, V X E {A, RU} , 3 efficient algorithm Ex, V PPT allies L
Pr (er, dr) +- G(1);
ex <-OUT 'RA r *1,'
h -A;
c - ALdx(),D(-,dr,-)(ex, er)
Ex(h, c, er, ex) = D(c, dr, ex) given that c L,) ] > 1 - neg(rj)
where the oracle L' operates as follows: on any input, run L on the history h' of the adversary at
the time of the call to L'. When L produces an output (i, e', d'), run E(m, e', d') to produce the
output c. Add c to the (initially empty) set L, and also return c to the adversary.
(Note that if X = RU, then it expects its input to the registration protocol to be 1 and not
er. Hence, we assume that if RU finds input er that it extracts 1 from it and proceeds as normal.
Also note that if the sender key is registered by an honest participant RU then h, the history of the
adversary, will be empty.)
Remarks. Note that these definitions do not guarantee anonymity of the sender. That is, senders
must register their keys, and so it might be that they can no longer send messages without their
name attached in some way. We note three things with respect to this.
1. If plaintext-awareness is not required, a sender may simply use an unregistered key. Encryption
will still be secure against the chosen-ciphertext attack.
2. Each registered key does not necessarily represent a sender but rather one incarnation of a
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sender. Senders may register many keys in order to bolster their anonymity.
3. In our implementation, registration uses only the values of keys and not the identity of the
registrant. Thus, the registration process could remain anonymous. It will still be possible to
trace multiple messages back to the same sender, but the identity of the sender will not be
revealed.
We choose to regard the possibility of sender authentication as an opportunity rather than a draw-
back, and use it in an essential way in our implementation.
3.2 Cryptographic Building-Blocks
The two implementations that follow use a wide variety of powerful cryptographic primitives.
Semantically-secure encryption for public-key encryption has already been introduced (Definition 3).
We will also use digital signatures:
Definition 21 (Digital Signature Scheme) A digital signature scheme is a triple (Gig, SSig, VSig)
where:
* Gig is the (probabilistic) key generator, which generates pairs (s, v) of signature generation
keys (s) and verification keys (v),
" Ssig is the (probabilistic) signing algorithm, which takes an arbitrary message and a signature
verification key and returns a signature, and
" Vig is the verification algorithm, which takes a message, a signature, and a verification key to
return a single bit;
such that for all security parameters r7 and messages m,
Pr [(s, v) <- Gig (1'); sig < Ssig (m, s) : Vig (in, sig, v) = 1] = 1
Digital signatures are the dual to public-key encryption: the signature does not hide the message in
any way, and can be verified by anyone. However, only the entity that should be able to create a
valid signature (one that verifies against a given message and verification key) should be the one who
knows the signing key. In particular, an adversary (who does not know the signature verification
key) should not be able to find a signature that verifies against a given message and verification key,
even if it can choose the message itself [27]:
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Definition 22 (Security for digital signatures) A digital signature scheme is secure against
the chosen-message attack if
V PPT adversaries A:
Pr[ (s, v) +- Geig (1');
(m,1 Sig) <-As-(-,s) (171, v):
V(m, sig,v) =1 ] neg(71)
It is required that the m produced by the adversary not have previously been given as input to the
oracle.
Note that this definition of security could allow the adversary to transform one valid signature sig of
a message m into another valid signature sig' of that same message. We will wish to prohibit this,
and so consider the special case where each message has a single valid signature relative to a given
verification key [28, 41, 22, 44]:
Definition 23 A digital signature scheme (Gsig, Ssig, Vsig) provides unique signatures if Ssig is de-
terministic.
We will also use a series of powerful tools based on computational proofs, where a proof scheme
is a game between two interacting machines, one playing the prover and one playing the verifier.
Suppose that L is a language in /P with witness relation LR. The prover wishes to convince the
verifier of a theorem: that a given 1 is in L. The real prover should be able to do so if the theorem
is true and the prover has a witness for 1 (i.e. an element of LR(l)) but no prover (even malicious
ones) should be able to do so otherwise:
Definition 24 (Interactive proof system) A pair of interactive PPT Turing machines, a prover
P and a verifier V, are an interactive proof system for a language L E )PP with witness relation LR
if:
1. Completeness: If 1 G L and the honest prover has a valid witness, then it can produce a proof
which is acceptable to the verifier (except with negligible probability):
Pr [b <- OUTP-v ((l, R(l)), ,11): b 1] ; 1 - neg(|ll)
2. Soundness: If 1 L then no prover (even a malicious one that wishes to "fool" the verifier)
can produce a proof which is acceptable to the verifier (except with negligible probability): P',
Pr b -- OUT "'v (1, -1l,) : b = < neg(ll)
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The above definition is satisfied by the trivial protocol where the prover simply sends the witness to
the verifier. In our application of such protocols, we will require in addition that the proof system
be zero-knowledge [8, 24, 26] meaning that the verifier learns nothing from the proof other than the
truth of the theorem. That is, we wish that anything a (possibly malicious) verifier could do after
the proof it could have also accomplished before. We formalize this by requiring the existence of
a simulator that can create valid-seeming proofs for a given 1 c L but without the witness itself.
Then, if the malicious verifier can perform some action after the proof, it could have done so without
the proof by running the simulator and continuing as if the proof had occurred.
Definition 25 (Zero-knowledge (ZK) proof system) A pair of interactive PPT Turing ma-
chines, a prover P and a verifier V, are a zero-knowledge interactive proof system for a language
L E ARP with witness relation LR if they are an interactive proof system for L and for every ma-
licious verifier V' there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S such that for every I E L
and w e LR(l):
(1, t) : t <- TRANSP,v' ((I, w) , .11, -) a (1, t) : t <-S(1)}
A proof of knowledge [8] is a proof system where the prover proves knowledge of a witness. At first
glance, it would seem that the definition of a proof system captures this. However, there may be
languages in AFP where it is easy to decide membership but hard to find witnesses. In particular,
one could imagine public-key encryption schemes where public keys are all of a certain simple form.
Thus, it is easy to decide if a given string is in the language of public keys. However, this is
quite different from asserting that one knows the corresponding secret key. For example, one may
consider the language COMP of composite natural numbers, where the witness for a x E COMP is its
factorization. Although one can efficiently recognize elements of COMP [5], it is widely assumed to be
hard to compute x's witness from x alone. 2
Also, a formal definition makes the concept of algorithm's "knowledge" explicit: an algorithm
"knows" a value if it is possible to extract that value from the algorithm. That is, a proof scheme
for L E NP is also a proof of knowledge for the witness relation if there exists an extractor that can
produce a witness to a given theorem by repeated interaction with the prover. Specifically, suppose
that a (possibly malicious) prover can produce with probability p a valid-seeming proof for a given
theorem. Then the extractor can produce a witness to that theorem with probability close to p. To
do so, extractor can "reset" the prover into its original, pre-proof state, and can see and take part
in multiple (interactive) proofs of the given theorem. (Note that the prover uses the same witness
for each proof.)
Definition 26 (Proof of knowledge system) A pair of interactive PPT Turing machines, a
2 lndeed, the security of the RSA scheme [58], where public keys are in COMP and witnesses are private keys, depends
on this assumption.
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prover P and a verifier V, are a proof-of-knowledge system for a language L E KP with witness
relation LR if (P, V) are an interactive proof system for L and there exists a oracle-calling probabilis-
tic polynomial-time machine E such that for every malicious prover P', every I E L, every y G {o, 1}*
(which may or may not be a witness to 1), and random tape r G {0, 1}*:
Pr [w <- OUTV E ((I, y), rVl, -) : w E R(l) > Pr b <- OUTP'v ((I, y), ril, -) : b = 1 - neg (q)
A non-interactive proof system [12] is a special type of proof system that consists of a single message
from prover to verifier. However, if the entire protocol is under the control of the prover, it is
difficult to prohibit it from "proving" false theorems. For this reason, we assume the existence of
a common reference string of randomness, readable by both prover and verifier but writable by
neither. Intuitively, the string provides a random challenge to the prover, which restricts its control
over the protocol and keeps it honest:
Definition 27 (Non-interactive proof system) Let f : AP- > M be a polynomial. Then (f, P, V)
is a non-interactive proof system for a language L E MP with witness relation LR if
1. Completeness: For all I E L, all w E R(l), and all reference strings 0- {Eo, IIf(11),
V(l, P(l, w, a),o) = 1
2. Soundness: For all malicious provers P', then
Pr[ - <- {O, 1}f ;
(x, p) - ()
x i L but V(x, p, o-) = 1 ] neg (r/)
We can also modify the definition of zero-knowledge for the special setting of non-interaction [11, 60,
12, 14]. Simulation is possible if the common, supposedly-random, reference string is deliberately
chosen by the simulator S:
Definition 28 (Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system) (f, P, V, S) is a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof system [12] for a language L C MP with witness relation LR if
1. (f, P, V) is a non-interactive proof system for L, and
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2. Zero-Knowledge: For all malicious verifiers V', Exp1 (rq) Exp(7) where
Exp1 (77) = Pr[ o +- {0, 1} f ( ;
(l, w) <- V'(o-);
p +- P(l, w, o):
V'(p) ]
Exp 2(77) = Pr[ o- -- S(17);
(l, w) +- V'(-);
p +- S'(l)
V'(p)]
(Both the simulator S and the malicious verifier V' keep state between their invocations.)
Definition 27 above prevents a malicious prover from producing a proof of a false theorem. It does
not, however, prevent a malicious prover from modifying a proof of one (true) theorem into a valid-
seeming proof of another (false) theorem. In a manner analogous to chosen-ciphertext security, we
wish to prevent the corrupt prover from producing a false proof even after having seen proofs for
theorems of its choice. For technical reasons, the definition gives the adversary simulated proofs
instead of real ones. 3 However, this weaker definition will suffice for our purposes.
Definition 29 (Non-malleable NIZK (NM-NIZK) proof system) (f, P, V, S) is a non-malleable
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system [59] for a language L if
1. There exists a non-interactive proof system 7r = (f', P', V') for L, and
2. For all adversaries A and all polynomial-time relations R', there exists an oracle-calling ma-
chine M such that Exp1 (rq) 2 Exp 2 (r7) where
Expj(7) = Pr[ E <- S(17);
(i', P', a) <-- As(', E,K) (,p
p' not produced by S2 A (V(x', p', E) = 1) A R(x', a) ],
Exp 2 (77) = Pr[ o- +- {O, 1}';
(X', IP'I, a) <- MA (0 -
(V(x', p', o-) = 1) A R(x', a)
Here, the algorithm M plays the role of the simulator, and produces the new proof p' with access
only to A and not to the source of valid (seeming) proofs.4
3 Real proofs require a witness, which may not be simulatable.
4 We note that this is stronger than the form of non-malleability originally used to implement chosen-ciphertext
security [59]. That form of this definition allowed the adversary access to only one externally-generated valid proof.
Although we will be using it in much the same way, we require non-malleability even when the adversary has access
to many proofs. Also., an implementation of this stronger form was also given in the original paper [59].
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3.3 Our Implementation
In this section, we propose an implementation of a registration-based plaintext-aware encryption
scheme. That is, we provide a protocol for sender-key creation and registration, and algorithms
for receiver-key generation, encryption, and decryption. The scheme must provide plaintext aware-
ness when the registration authority is honest and chosen-ciphertext security when the registration
authority is corrupt.
The intuition of our implementation is simple:
" Following Rackoff and Simon [57], we make the encryption of a message depend on the public
keys of both sender and receiver. In particular, we ensure that the ciphertexts of our scheme
can be decrypted using the private keys of either receiver or sender.
* Our registration process requires that the sender prove to the registration authority (in a zero-
knowledge way) knowledge of their private keys. Thus, a successful registration ensures that the
registrant knows enough information to decrypt any ciphertext they create. However, because
the registration process is zero-knowledge, no registration authority (honest or corrupt) can
gain any information about the sender's secret key.
* Lastly, we use digital signatures to ensure that only the registrant can make valid ciphertexts.
Thus, valid ciphertexts must come only from parties that can prove possession of knowledge
sufficient to decrypt.
The actual encryption mechanism is based on the schemes of Naor and Yung [52] and Sahai [59].
In those schemes, the receiver's public keys is a triple of two public keys for some semantically-secure
encryption scheme and a reference string for a NIZK proof system. The sender encrypts the plaintext
under both component keys individually. It sends not only the two resulting ciphertexts, but also
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (relative to the reference string in the receiver's public key)
that they do in fact contain the same plaintext. If the NIZK proof system is also non-malleable,
then the resulting encryption scheme is chosen-ciphertext secure [59].
Our scheme takes this one step further by adding a self-referential "twist:" the sender now
encrypts in both of the receiver's keys and in one of his own. The NIZK proof shows that all three
contain the same plaintext. Lastly, we require that the sender sign each ciphertext with some secure
signature scheme. Thus, if a ciphertext is well-formed (meaning that the proof and signature are
both valid) then the sender must know their own key and be able to decrypt it.
More formally, our scheme S =(, C,'D, RU, RA) uses the following four cryptographic primi-
tives as building-blocks:
* (G, E, D), a semantically secure cryptosystem in the sense of [25].
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* (f, P, V, S), a non-malleable NIZK proof system for NP in the sense of [59], where P is the
proving algorithm, V is the verification algorithm, S is the simulator, and f(rj) is the length of
the reference string for security parameter ij.
* a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge system for NP [8, 24, 26], and
" A secure signature scheme (G,,g, Ssig, Vsig) [27].
Given these, the scheme S is as follows:
* g (receiver key generation): Generate (el, dj) and (e2 , d2 ) according to G(1 1 ). Pick a random
o- from {0, 1}f(n). The public (receiver's) key is e, = (ei, e2 , -) and the secret key is d,
(er, di, d2 ).
* RU and IZA (sender key-generation and registration): First, RU generates (e3 , d3) according
to G(1'7). Next, generate (s, v) according to Gig. The public (sender's) key is e, = (1, e3 , v),
and the private key is d, = (e5, d3 , s). Next, RU engages RA in a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge for d3 and s. If the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge terminates correctly, R.A
outputs e, and RA output (es, d,). Otherwise, they both output I.
Recall that we assume the key-registration process to be a secure atomic operation. In par-
ticular, we assume that the adversary cannot interfere with the protocol executions of honest
parties (unless it is the ostensible user or authority). In particular, we assume that the adver-
sary cannot execute the protocol concurrently with other (honest) executions, or modify the
messages of a protocol between two honest users.
* S, on input (m, (ei, e2 , 0-), ((1", e3 , v), d3 , s)) first computes ci = E(ei,m), c 2 = E(e 2 , m), and
C3 = E'(e 3 , m). Then, it computes 7r, a non-malleable NIZK proof against reference string -
that ci, c 2 , and c3 all encrypt the same message relative to el, e2, and e3 , respectively. It then
creates sig +- Ssig ((cl, c2, c3, 7r), s), and outputs (ci, c 2 , c 3 , 7r, sig).
" D, on input ((cic 2 , c 3 ,7r, sig), ((el, e2 , u), di, d2 ), (1', e3 , v)) first determines if the signature
sig is valid for message (ci, c2 , c 3 , 7r) with respect to verification key v. If not, it outputs 1.
Otherwise, it then determines if 7r is a valid proof (relative to the reference string 6) that ci, c2
and c3 are encryptions of the same message under el, e2 and e3 , respectively. If so, it outputs
D'(di,ci). Otherwise, it outputs I.
3.3.1 Security of S
Theorem 6 The scheme S is registration-based plaintext-aware encryption scheme.
We prove this via several lemmas.
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Lemma 7 S satisfies registration completeness.
Proof. By definition, the honest registrant knows the witness dd for theorem ed. Hence, the
completeness property of the proof-of-knowledge scheme ensures that the registration authority will
accept the theorem and proof almost all of the time.
Lemma 8 S satisfies encryption completeness.
Proof. If the sender is honest, then it produces (ci, c 2 , c3 , 7r, sig) where ci, c 2 and c3 all contain
the same plaintext m and 7r is an honest proof of that fact. Thus, the signature sig will always
verify and the completeness property of the NIZK proof system ensures that the proof 7r will almost
always be accepted. Thus, the decryption algorithm will almost always output D(ci, dr, e,). Due
to the fact that (G, E, D) is a public-key encryption scheme, this decryption will reveal the intended
plaintext.
Lemma 9 S satisfies honest security.
Proof. We will prove chosen-ciphertext security by the contrapositive. Suppose there is an
adversary A that succeeds in an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against an honest sender and an
honest recipient. In particular, we will give two algorithms, R and R' respectively, and we will prove
that one of the two must break the underlying encryption scheme.
R uses the adversary A to break the semantic security of the encryption scheme (G, E, D) as
follows:
1. It receives as input (e, 17).
2. First, we create the receiver's public key er = (el, e2 , -) and the sender's public key e=
(17, e3 , v) as follows. Pick a at random from {1, 2}. Set e3-a to be e and set (ea, d,) - G(1').
Generate o according to the simulator S for the NIZK proof system. Set (e3 , d3 ) +- G(17). Set
(s, v) +- Geig (1 7).-
3. Run A on input (er, es).
(a) Whenever A asks for a decryption of (c', c', c', ir', sig'), encrypted with sending key e', we
verify the signature sig' using the verification key in e'. We check the correctness of Tr'
using V. If it verifies, we decrypt c' using da and output that as the result. Otherwise
we return I.
(b) Whenever A asks for the encryption of (m', (e', e', a')), we encrypt m' under e', e' and e3
to get c' , c' and c' respectively. We create the NIZK proof 7r' that all three contain the
same ciphertext, and sign (c' , c', c', 7r') with s to get sig'. We return (c', c', c', 7r', sig').
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4. Eventually A will output (mo, min). Output (mo, in) and obtain challenge c. For notation
later, let us say that ng is the message c encrypts.
5. We then simulate the ciphertext challenge for A. Pick b at random from {0, 1}. Let c, +-
E'(ea, 77b), and set C3-a < c. With probability 1/2, let c 3 <- E'(e 3 , inb) and otherwise, let
C3 <- E'(e 3 , mi-b). Fake the NIZK proof 7r using the simulator S, and sign the ciphertexts and
proof with s.
6. Run A on input (ci, c 2, c3 , 7r).
7. Again, whenever A asks for a decryption we check the signature, verify the proof, and decrypt
using da. Whenever A asks for an encryption, we create one as above.
8. Eventually A outputs an answer b'. If b = b', output b'. Otherwise, output a random bit.
There are three kinds of input the adversary can get.
I. First, it is possible that c 1 , c2 , and c 3 all encrypt the same message mo. In this case, the input
given to the adversary is indistinguishable from the input in the real attack the adversary
succeeds in. Thus, the adversary must return 3 with probability 1/2 + e, where e is some
non-negligible function of 77.
II. Second, it may be that ci and c2 both encrypt the same message mo but c 3 encrypts min-.
Let x be the probability that the adversary returns 3 in this case.
III. Finally, it may be that ci and c2 encrypt different messages. Note that there are two subcases:
Ca and c3 encrypt the same message while C3a encrypts the other, and
SC3-a and C3 encrypt the same message while ca encrypts the other
These two cases are indistinguishable to the adversary. Since the adversary cannot make any
proofs of false theorems, the oracle will return I if the adversary ever makes a decryption
query when ci and c2 encrypt different messages. Thus, the case a = 1 and the case a = 2 give
the same distribution. (See [59]. This is just like one of the main details from Sahai's proof
that his scheme is CCA2-secure.)
Let mf, be the message encrypted in c 3 , and let y be the probability that the adversary returns
0' in this case.
This reduction is parameterized by the values x and y, both of which can be chosen by the
adversary. However, we will show that the only value of interest to us is x. In fact, we will show that
for almost all values of x, the above reduction violates the semantic security of (G, E, D). However,
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the reduction R will not work for certain values of x, so we will show that in those cases a different
algorithm R' will.
To begin: what is the probability that R returns the correct answer? Again, we consider two
cases: when b = 3 and when b $ 3:
" In the case that b = 0, the adversary sees an input of type I with probability 1/2. When the
adversary sees an input of type I, R is correct with probability ( + ) + 2 (2 - ) + . If
the adversary does not see an input of type I even though b = 0, then it sees an input of type II.
In this case, R is correct with probability x+ (1 -x)/2 (since whenever the adversary returns 3
in an input of type II, R is correct, and the rest of the time, R is correct with probability 1/2).
Thus, the total probability that R is correct when b = 3 is } ((3/4 + c/2) + (1/2 + x/2)).
" Now let us examine the case that b $ 3. Any time this is true, we give input type III to
the adversary. However, with probability 1/2, mb is encrypted in c3 and with probability 1/2,
ml-b is encrypted in c3. (Recall, these two cases are indistinguishable to the adversary.) Thus,
the adversary returns b with probability y + (1 - y), and otherwise returns 1 - b. In this
case, our total probability of being correct is (y/4) + (1 - y)/4 = 1/4 , since we are only correct
when the adversary returns 1 - b, and then, only half the time.
Taking into account all cases, the probability that R is correct is
1 ( (3/4 + E/2) + -1(1/2 + x/2) +
This expression evaluates to
3 c 1 x 1 7 E+x
16 8 8 8 8 16 8
Now if c + x is non-negligibly different from 1/2 then the above expression is also, and R violates
the semantic security of (G, E, D). If x ~ 1/2 - E, on the other hand, then we can use A to break the
security of (G, E, D) in a different way. Let R' be the algorithm that, on input e, operates as follows:
1. Generate (ei, di) and (e2 , d2) by running G'(1"). Generate a according to the simulator S for
the NIZK proof system. Generate (s, v) by running Gs. Set e3 to e.
2. Run A on input ((el, e 2 , U), (e3 , s)).
(a) Whenever A asks for a decryption query, verify the proof and signature. If both verify,
we decrypt c1 using d, and output that as the result. Otherwise we return I.
(b) Whenever A' makes an encryption query, we encrypt, create the proof, and sign as in the
previous reduction.
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3. Obtain mo, mi as the output of A. Output (mo, nil) and obtain challenge c. For notation
later, let us say that mo is the message c encrypts.
4. Pick b at random from {0, 1}. Let ci <- E'(e1 , m7b), let c 2 <- E'(e 2 , mb), and let c3 be c.
5. Fake the NIZK proof 7r using the simulator S.
6. Sign with s to make signature sig.
7. Run A on input (ci, c2 , c3 , 7r, sig). Again, whenever A asks for a decryption, we check the
signature and proof, and decrypt using dI. Whenever A asks for an encryption, we create one
as above. Eventually A outputs an answer b'. Output b'.
The proof that R' works is simple. If R' picks b = 3 then A outputs b with probability 1/2 + e.
If R' picks b $ / then A sees input type II and so it outputs b with probability x = 1/2 - E + v'
where v' is (positively or negatively) negligible. Thus in either case, we output 3 with probability
at least 1/2 + e - Iv'/21.
Lemma 10 S enjoys plaintext awareness.
Proof. There are two cases. In this first case, suppose that X = RU. We need an extractor ERU
such that ERU will accurately predict the output of the receiver's decryption algorithm. Let ERU be
the algorithm that simply returns I. If this ERU is not correct a non-negligible proportion of the
time, then the adversary has a non-negligible probability of forging a signature. Because the digital
signature scheme is secure against the chosen-plaintext attack, this is a contradiction.
Let us show this formally. Suppose that for some adversary, the extractor ERU is incorrect with
a polynomial probability. Then with that same polynomial probability, the adversary produces
something that does not decrypt to I:
E adversary A, 3 PPT ally L, ] polynomial q, for infinitely many 77
Pr[ (er, dr) <- G(17);
ex <-OUTx RA (er, -11, -
h <- -A;
L' (-)D(-,d-,*)
c <- A dRU (ex, er)
D(c, dr, ex) # 1 given that c § L,) ] > --1--
We use A and L to construct an adversary A' that will violate the security of the signature scheme
(Gqig, Ssig, Vsig). This new adversary A' works as follows:
* On input 1" and v, A' will pick (eidi) -- G'(1'7), (e 2 ,d 2 ) -- G'(11), (e3 ,d 3 ) +- G'(1'), -<
{0, 1} . It gives eRU = (e 3 , v) and er = (el, e 2 , C-) to A.
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* If A makes a call to D(., dr, -) with c' and e', A' will decrypt as usual. That is, it checks the
signature component in c' with the verification key in e' and the proof component of c' against
the reference string in d,. It then decrypts with d, and returns the result.
* If A makes a call to L',(), then A' simulates L on the history of A (which it is also simulating).
It then takes the resulting (7n, e') and creates the return value c' as thus:
- It encrypts m in e3 from e. It also encrypts in in the e' and e' from e'.
- It proves, relative to the reference string -' from e', that all three of these ciphertexts
contain the same plaintext.
- It then sends the three ciphertexts and the proof to the signing oracle Sig (s, -) to get a
signature.
The three ciphertexts, proof, and signature from the oracle are jointly returned to A'.
" When A returns a ciphertext (ci, c 2, c 3, 7r, sig), return (ci, c 2 , c3 , 7r) as the message m and sig
as the signature.
Suppose that D((ci, c 2 , c 3 , 7r, sig), d, = ((el, e2, u), di, d2 ), eRU = (e 3 , v)) returns anything other than
I. Then it must be that Vsig ((ci, c2, c3, 7r), sig, v) = 1. Furthermore, we know that (ci, c 2 , c3, 7r, sig)
cannot be a ciphertext returned by the ally. Thus, either (ci, c2 , ca, 7r) is not a message sent to the
signature oracle, or it was but sig is not the signature that it returned for that message. However,
we know that every message has a unique signature. Hence, it must be that (ci, C2, c3, 7r) was not
signed by the signing oracle, and the adversary has created a new message (ci, c 2 , c 3 , 7r) and a valid
signature sig for it. Thus, if ERU does not predict the receiver's output (except for a negligible
fraction of the time) then A' violates the security of the digital signature scheme.
In the other case, X = A, and the adversary registered eA. Then the simulator EA is as follows:
" On input (h, (ci, c2, c3,7r,sig), e, = (el,e2, a), eA = (e 3 , v)), we use h to rewind the adversary
to the point where A engages in key registration with RA. This key-registration process is
the execution of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the private key. Hence, there exists
an extractor E for the proof system that will be able to extract the public keys given oracle
access to the (possibly malicious) prover A. By assumption, A is able to register its public key,
so we run the extractor (with oracle access to A, rewound to the registration step) to extract
d = (d3 , v), the secret key associated with eA.
" We then verify the signature sig and verify the proof 7r; if either are invalid, we output I.
" Otherwise, we use d3 to decrypt c3 and give the result as the answer.
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From the extractibility property of the proof system, d must be a secret key relative to e. However,
we need to show that the decryption under d will always be the same as the decryption under dr.
If the signature sig or the proof 7r in c fails to verify, then certainly we are correct to output .
If both verify, however, we need to show that (except with negligible probability) that ci, c2 , and
c3 all encrypt the same message. However, this is the same as showing that the proof system is
non-malleable even when the adversary has access to a polynomial number of valid proofs, which
is our assumption. Hence, if the proof 7r verifies then all three ciphertexts will contain the same
plaintext. By decrypting c3 with d3 we will produce the same plaintext as the decryption algorithm
would by decrypting ci with di.
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Chapter 4
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange in
the Dolev-Yao model
In this chapter, we introduce consider the extension of the Dolev-Yao model to include the Diffie-
Hellman key-agreement scheme. This widely-used scheme relies upon properties of a commutative
algebra and, as opposed to the basic Dolev-Yao algebra, requires non-freeness of terms.
We introduce an extension of the Dolev-Yao algebra that allows protocol designers to express the
Diffie-Hellman scheme as part of their protocols. This extension allows the adversary to perform any
efficient computation on Diffie-Hellman values, and considers the non-freeness that they (and the
Diffie-Hellman scheme itself) introduce. We also formulate a formal version of the Diffie-Hellman
assumption in the extended Dolev-Yao model that is targeted for the analysis of real-world protocols.
Lastly, we consider the computational soundness of our extension. In particular, we introduce
a computational interpretation of attacks in the Dolev-Yao model. We show that under this inter-
pretation, any Dolev-Yao attack that violates the formal version of the Diffie-Hellman assumption
maps to a computational algorithm that violates the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption also.
4.1 Overview
In the two previous sections, we have shown that it is possible to ground a large part of the standard
Dolev-Yao model in the more concrete world of computational cryptography. Many popular real-
world protocols will not be affected by this grounding, however, because they do not yet fit into the
Dolev-Yao model.
Consider the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [19] protocol. This widely-used key-exchange
protocol does not use public-key encryption at all, but requires symmetric encryption, hashing,
digital signatures, and the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange scheme. At its most distilled form, this
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protocol is a series of four messages between a client (C) and server (S)':
1. C - S : C
2. S : C S [g],
3. C -- S: [gY]K, jT 1 C S}K,
4. S- C : T2 C SK,
where
" T 1 , T 2 are fixed tags to distinguish the third message from the fourth,
" [M] K, is the message M together with a signature that can be verified using the verification
key Kx,
" 
4 M}K, is the message M encrypted with the symmetric key K',
" g is a generator for some group G,
" x, y are randomly chosen elements of {1, 2,. .. IG }, and
" K' is a symmetric key created by hashing the value gxy.
The first three of these operations-symmetric encryption, digital signatures, and hashing-are not
totally foreign to the Dolev-Yao model. Like public-key encryption, they are general definitions
that can be satisfied by a variety of implementations. It is reasonable to treat them as public-key
encryption was treated: represented by formal operations which allow the formal adversary only
limited abilities while also showing that the same limitation applies to the computational adversary.
We anticipate that there will soon appear an analysis, like that of Chapter 2, demonstrating
computational soundness for these three operations, and hence do not focus on them here. (We
will require a strong security condition on hashing later in this chapter, however.) Computational
soundness for the Diffie-Hellman scheme, on the other hand, seems to be tricker:
o Firstly, it is not obvious which is the best way to even represent the Diffie-Hellman scheme
in the Dolev-Yao model. The Dolev-Yao model assumes that the algebra is free, and one
can conceive of encoding operations that preserve this freeness. The Diffie-Hellman scheme,
on the other hand, requires non-freeness: the correct operation of the scheme requires that
(g')Y = (gy)'. Given this, it is not obvious how to capture the non-free group and its operations
in the (traditionally) free Dolev-Yao algebra. 2
lThe full TLS protocol is much more elaborate. primarily to ensure robustness and compatibility. It actually
has two basic forms, one based on Difie-Hellman and one based on public-key encryption. We show here only the
security-relevant messages of the Diffie-Hellman version.
2 There are approaches to Diffie-Hellman in formal cryptography which do not use the Dolev-Yao model and which
use non-free cryptosystems. See Lynch[40] for an example.
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* Also, it is not clear what powers the Dolev-Yao adversary has with respect to the Diffie-Hellman
scheme. Some candidate abilities spring quickly to mind:
- Just as it can always create fresh nonces and keys, the Dolev-Yao adversary should be
able to create fresh Diffie-Hellman values.
- Since the Diffie-Hellman scheme requires the honest participants to calculate the group
operation (and exponentiation) the adversary must be able to do so as well.
As reasonable as these two operations are, it is unreasonable to assume that an adversary
would be limited to them-in either model.
There are many possible resolutions to these difficulties, and to choose among them one must
decide whether to use the Dolev-Yao model to find flaws or to generate proofs. If one wishes to find
flaws (but does not necessarily need completeness of the flaw-finding algorithm) then one can simply
select any convenient representation and any convenient set of Dolev-Yao operations. If these are
chosen carefully, then automated flaw-finding algorithms can be applied to uncover any flaws from
a given class. (This is the approach taken in, for example, [56].)
We, however, take a different tactic in this chapter. We wish to use the Dolev-Yao model to
generate high-level proofs that remain valid in the computational model. To do this, we will take an
approach much like that in Chapter 2: we present a syntactic limitation on the Dolev-Yao adversary,
and prove that it corresponds to an analogous restriction on the computational adversary. However,
we will now do this in the absence of any obvious closure operation. To define a new closure
operation for Diffie-Hellman would require that the adversary's powers be rigorously enumerated,
and as mentioned above, we do not know what this enumeration should be.
However the closure operation in Chapters 1 and 2 was only an intermediate definition between
the assumptions of the Dolev-Yao model and the computational definition of chosen-ciphertext
security. Such an intermediate step is not strictly necessary. Our intent in the present chapter is
to disregard this intermediate step and connect the Dolev-Yao model directly to the Diffie-Hellman
assumption. With this decided, our resolution to the two difficulties above becomes clear.
The Diffie-Hellman assumptions stipulate that given computation is beyond the reach of any
reasonable adversary, and so there is no need to decide on explicit powers for the Dolev-Yao adversary.
If we represent the Diffie-Hellman assumption properly, then it will remain sound even if we allow
the Dolev-Yao adversary to perform efficient computations. This is exactly what we will do: rather
than limit the adversary to some artificial set, we allow it to perform any efficient calculation. 3
We develop our approach in several parts. First, we expand the Dolev-Yao model to incorporate
the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange scheme. This expansion itself takes multiple steps:
3As an added benefit, this ensures that our results will remain valid even if the adversary is limited in order to aid
the discovery of flaws.
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" First, the algebra A is itself expanded. We add operations for symmetric encryption, sig-
natures, and hashing. Because we later allow the adversary to perform arbitrary efficient
computations, we will also include a new symbol to represent each such calculation. However,
we insist that the Dolev-Yao algebra remain free. As mentioned above, we cannot continue
to assume non-freeness when we add arbitrary computation. Furthermore, the Diffie-Hellman
scheme requires non-freeness to even operate. However, both of these statements refer to
non-freeness in the computational setting. Thus, we can continue to assume freeness in the
Dolev-Yao setting and non-freeness in the computational setting. We reconcile the freeness or
lack thereof of the two setting when we show how attacks in the formal world map to attacks
(or algorithms) in the computational one.
" We perform this reconciliation when we revise the notion of a valid trace. Our new definition
serves two purposes: first, it makes explicit the internal operations of the adversary (which
Assumption 3 hid behind the closure operation). Second, it captures the realities of the
computational non-freeness. That is, a valid trace can now use two different Dolev-Yao terms
interchangeably, so long as they have the same computational interpretation.
We note that as a result valid Dolev-Yao traces are now defined (in part) in terms of the
underlying bit-string representation-a departure from the encoding algorithm of Section 1.3.
Given the expanded Dolev-Yao model, it is almost trivial to define the Dolev-Yao representation of
the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The Dolev-Yao model, after all, is an alternative model of executions.
There is a natural mapping from Dolev-Yao traces to computational algorithms. Given this, there
is a similarly natural way to characterize traces that "solve" the Diffie-Hellman problem and to give
a syntactic security condition (Property DR, definition 40) that prohibits them. We show this, and
that traces that violate condition DR map to algorithms that solve the computational Diffie-Hellman
problem-no matter which cryptographic algorithms are chosen to implement the mapping.
This, however, is not enough. Dolev-Yao protocols are not a pror required to be efficiently
computable. Hence, traces over infeasible protocols may not map to efficient algorithms. Such
algorithms that solve the Diffie-Hellman problem do not necessarily violate the Diffie-Hellman as-
sumption. It is legitimate for traces to violate condition DR if the honest participants inadvertently
aid the adversary in doing so.
We resolve this difficulty by imposing efficiency upon the protocols. In particular, we define what
it means for a protocol to be "silent" (Definition 41), a natural and purely syntactic condition on
protocols. A silent protocol is one where honest participants will never use a secret Diffie-Hellman
value as a message or a plaintext, but only as key material. One the one hand, this condition is
natural enough to capture a large class of real-world protocols such as TLS and SSH. On the other
hand, this condition allows us to use security properties of the computational algorithms to restrict
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the honest participants. In particular, we show that traces of silent traces map to efficient algorithms
if hashing can be implemented with our friend, the random oracle.
Thus, a trace that violates security condition DR maps to an algorithm that solves Diffie-
Hellman. Furthermore, a trace over a silent protocol can be mapped, via the random oracle, to
an efficient algorithm. Hence, the main result of this work that under the random oracle and
computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions, there can be no trace over a silent protocol that also
violates condition DR. Thus, it is computationally sound to use and assume property DR. (See [32]
for an example.)
The use of the random oracle here is analogous to its use in Theorem 1. That is, it is used to
show that a connection between the Dolev-Yao and computational models can be made. Just as
Chapters 2 and 3 remove the random oracle in the case of the standard Dolev-Yao model, we expect
future work to remove the random oracle from this chapter as well. In fact, we will mention some
possible approaches to this in Chapter 5.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. First, we quickly review the Diffie-Hellman assumption given
in Chapter 1.4, and present a weaker form that will be useful for our present purposes (Section 4.2).
We then extend the Dolev-Yao model to include the Diffie-Hellm-an scheme by first expanding the
algebra (Section 4.3.1) and then by expanding the notion of valid traces (Section 4.3.2).
We then define the security condition DR and the notion of silent protocols. We first "derive"
these definitions informally (Section 4.4). We then give the mapping from valid Dolev-Yao traces
to algorithms (Section 4.5) and the first of our primary results: a proof that a trace that violates
condition DR maps to an algorithm that solves Diffie-Hellman (Theorem 12). We then restrict our
attention to silent protocols (Section 4.6) and show that the random oracle allows us to efficiently
simulate their computational interpretations. Thus, traces over silent protocols that violate condition
D map to algorithms that solve Diffie-Hellman efficiently (Theorem 11).
4.2 The Diffie-Hellman Problem
In this section, we review the Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme that was introduced in Sec-
tion 1.4. All participants of this scheme must agree on a family {g, G } (where each G is a cyclic
group generated by g,) which is fixed and indexed by the security parameter. When the security
parameter 77 is clear from context, we will refer to G , and g, as simply G and g. It is assumed that
every element of G, can be represented with a number of bits polynomial in 71.
Two entities A and B can use this family to agree on a secret random value in the following way:
* A value of the security parameter 77 is chosen via some external mechanism. 4
4 1n practice, this is either fixed in a standards document or negotiated via a preliminary round of communication.
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* A chooses a random element x E {1.. . GI} and sends to B the value gx, and
" B chooses a random element y E {1 ... Gn1} and sends to A the value gy.
The random value upon which they have agreed is g9 y, which both can calculate:
" A can calculate gxy from x and gy via (gY)' = gxy and
" B can calculate gxy from y and gx via (gx)Y = gxY.
We will call the values gx and gY the base Diffie-Hellman values, and call gxy the Diffie-Hellman
secret.
Note that the scheme provides no authentication. Although A can be sure that the secret value
9 xY is known only to A herself and the entity that generated y, A cannot tell who that entity is.
Authentication and identification must be ensured by some other mechanism.
The scheme is, however, assumed to provide secrecy in the sense that no agent other than A and
B should be able to learn the value gxy. This notion can be formalized in two different ways. The
stronger formalization is the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, which is given in Section 1.4.
Briefly, this assumption states that no efficient adversary can distinguish the actual Diffie-Hellman
key from a random group element:
Definition 30 The decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for a group family {g 7, G7}7 is:
V PPT algorithms A, IExp 1 (q) - ExP 2 (77)1 < neg(r,)
where
Expl(,q) =Pr[ x,y <- {1, 2, ... , lG,};
b A(1'7, G77, g9,, g s gx :9
b=1]
b=1
This is the form we will assume for this chapter. However, we will also use the original weaker form
known as the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, which simply requires that the adversary
be unable to produce gxy from only gx and gy:
Definition 31 The computational Diffie-Hellman problem over for a group family {G}, to produce
gXy from input gx and gy. The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is that the computational
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Diffie-Hellman problem is hard if x and y are chosen randomly:
V PPT algorithms A:
Pr[ X, y <-- {1, 2, ... , IG171};
h< A(17, G11,g'7, gX'g ):
h =g ] < neg(,q)
Note that the decisional form of the assumption implies the computational one, and thus is the
one usually assumed. We, however, will use the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in this
chapter. To do so, we first need to extend the Dolev-Yao algebra to the point that the assumption
can be even expressed.
4.3 Extending the Dolev-Yao Model
In incorporate Diffie-Hellman into the Dolev-Yao model, we expand the Dolev-Yao model in two
ways: we enlarge the algebra, and we reconsider the joint definition of the adversary and trace
validity.
4.3.1 Extending the Algebra
We will extend and modify the algebra of Chapter 1 in three ways.
We add operators for symmetric encryption, signatures and hashing. This is for two reasons:
1. We will later use properties of the hash algorithm in an essential way.
2. One of our ultimate goals is to enable the analysis of popular protocols such as TLS and SSH,
and these protocols use the above operations.
Signing a term is not assumed to hide the message in any fashion. Hashing a term is assumed to result
in a key appropriate for symmetric encryption. We will assume that keys for asymmetric encryption,
symmetric encryption and signatures are mutually disjoint, and that symmetric encryption keys
created through hashing are disjoint from those created directly.
Next, we add an additional type D for Diffie-Hellman messages (i.e. group elements). We will use
dl, d2 .. .as elements of D, and we assume there exists an operation DH : D x D -+ D to represent
the Diffie-Hellman operation. We denote the range of DH by DDH. In the literature and in practice,
the notation g' is often used as both a computational and formal variable and g", used instead of
the admittedly cumbersome DH(di, d2 ). In contexts where the model is clear, this overloading of
notation presents no difficulty. In this work, however, we are interested in the exact relationship
between the formal and computational models, and will use notation to distinguish the two. Thus,
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we will use the notation dl, d2 and DH(di, d2 ) only for the formal model, and the notation gZ, gY
and gXY only for the computational one.
Lastly, we will want (in the next section) to capture the possible behaviors of the adversary. As
mentioned above, we will allow the adversary to perform any efficient computation, which requires
us to define what we mean by this.
Definition 32 A function f : --+ R is noticeable if there exists a polynomial q such that f (n) >
1 for all sufficiently large 1).
For our purposes, computation can be performed efficiently if there is a machine with a noticeable
probability of performing it.
Definition 33 A function f : {0, 1}* -+ {0, 1}* is efficient or efficiently computable if there exists
a probabilistic Turing machine Mf so that Pr [Mj(x) = f(x)] is noticeable in |xl.
Since we will allow the adversary to perform any efficient computation, we will need a notation
to represent output so produced. Therefore, we add to the Dolev-Yao algebra a constructor for
each efficiently computable function. However, we will assume that the adversary can only perform
these computations on Diffie-Hellman values and only to produce Diffie-Hellman values. (We leave
consideration of the adversary's ability to produce values of other types to analyses like that in
Chapter 2.)
To combine and formalize these modifications:
Definition 34 The set of terms A is (now) assumed to be freely generated from four disjoint sets:
" T C A, which contains predictable texts,
* R C A, which contains unpredictable random values,
* )C C A, which contains keys, and
* D C A, which contains Diffie-Hellman values.
The set of keys (I) is divided into five disjoint sets:
" encryption keys (Z pub),
" decryption keys (kpriv)
" signature keys (AZsig),
* verification keys (AvZer), and
" keys for symmetric encryption (ASym).
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We assume a mapping inv which maps one member of a key pair to the other, and a symmetric key
to itself. Compound terms are built by the operations:
" hash : A -+ ZSym, representing hashing into keys. We will denote the range of hash by IChash
* encrypt : (Ksym U ICPub) x A -* A, which represents encryption.
" sig : ICSig x A -+ A, which represents signing a message.
" pair : A x A -4 A, which represents concatenation of terms.
" DH : D x D - D, which represents the Diffie-Hellman operation. (As mentioned previously,
we denote the range of DH by DDH-)
" The operator Ff : D* -+ D for each efficiently-computable f, where D is the set of finite
sequences from D. Note that although f is a function from bit-strings to bit-strings, we are
here using it as a function from D-sequences to D.
We will write sig(K, M) as [M]K. We also note that a previous definition of "ingredient" still
applies:
Definition 15 If M, N are two elements of A, then M is an ingredient of M', written M E N, if
the parse tree of M is a sub-tree of the parse tree of N.
That is, the ingredients of a message Al are those which must have been used in its creation. In
particular, this implies that the values di and d2 are ingredients of DH(di, d2 ), as well as ingredients
of Ff (d1, d 2). Also, M is an ingredient of hash (M).
We will also need a slight variation on .this intuition [63] to denote those messages which could
possibly be learned from M:
Definition 35 We say that M is a subterm of N, written M -< N, if:
* Al = N, or
* if N = N'N", then M -< N' or M -< N",
" if N = {N'\}K, then M -< N',
" if N = [N'],, then Al -< N',
* if N = DH (d1 ,d 2 ), then M -< d or M - d 2 ,
" if N = FF(d1, d 2 , .. - , d), then there exists a di so that A -< di.
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In particular, it is conceivable that one can learn g' from g'y (if, for example, y is chosen to be 1).
Hence, di can possibly be learned from DH(di,d 2) and dl -< DH(di, d2). Likewise, the function
f might be invertible, and so di -< FF(dl, d2 , - .. d,) for each di. Note, however, that K is not a
subterm of {IM}K or [M]K (unless K is also a subterm of M). This is because it is impossible to
learn a key from a symmetric encryption. Further, all public keys are already known and so it is
meaningless to speak of "learning" them from an encryption or signature.
4.3.2 Traces and the Adversary
In this chapter, as in Chapter 1, the adversary and the set of valid traces are defined in terms of
each other. One can think of a valid trace as one in which the adversary performs only the allowed
actions, or an adversary as an entity that can non-deterministically choose between valid traces. In
this chapter, however, we will not use any closure operation to compactly represent the adversary's
powers. Hence, the connection between the adversary and trace will be a little more direct.
We first list the powers which we assume the adversary possesses. The adversary can:
* make any predictable text,
" say any key it knows, whether in KAdv, KCPub or CVer,
" encrypt any message it knows with any encryption or symmetric key that it knows
" decrypt an encryption given that it knows the decryption key,
" sign any message it knows with any signature key it knows,
* extract the "plaintext" from any signature,
" hash any value it knows,
" make fresh random values, which we represent by allowing it to produce whatever it wants
from a distinguished set lZAd, C R,
* generate new Diffie-Hellman values, which we represent by distinguishing the set Dp C D and
allowing the adversary to produce any value in that set. (We assume that Dp and DDH are
disjoint.)
" perform the Diffie-Hellman operation, given that it knows one of the appropriate exponents.
That is, if it knows d, and created d2 (that is, d 2 E Dp) it can generate DH(di, d2 ).
" for every efficiently computable function f, we allow the adversary to generate Ff (dl, d2, ... d,)
if it knows dl, d 2 , ... d,.
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We note that although the Dolev-Yao algebra is free, two terms (such as Ff (d1 , d2 ,. ..d) and
Ff, (d', d', '. )) may represent the same "real" value. We will need to handle this possibility
when we define valid traces, and so need to formalize this notion. This, in turn, requires us to
extend the encoding operation to Diffie-Hellman additions to the Dolev-Yao algebra
Definition 36 (Extended encoding) Let q E A be the security parameter. Let t C {0, 1}' be a
random tape, partitioned into a length-r segment for each element of 'R, IC and D. Let {gn, Gn}n
be a family of cyclic groups. Then for any Al C D, M of the form DH(d1 , d 2), or M of the form
M= Ff (d1 , d 2 ,... d), the encoding of Al, written [M] , is defined recursively:
* If M E D, then [M] = (g', "DH value") where g is the generator for Go and the randomness
of am is used to generate an x uniformly from {1, 2,... GJ. (Note: since each element
of G is assumed to have a r-bit representation, there is more than enough randomness to
in o-y to generate the required uniform distribution.) Um is being interpreted as the binary
representation of a natural number.)
* If M = DH(d 1 ,d 2 ) then [d1]t is (gx, "DH value) for some gx E G. and [d 2] is (gY, "DH value)
for some gY E G. Then [DH(di,d 2)1' (gxy, "dh value"). We note that calculating g'Y from
gX and gY may not be efficiently computable, but delay discussion of this issue until Section 4.6.
* If M = F1 (di, d2 ,...d), then [M] is the mapping from distributions to distributions given by
f([d]t ,[d 2 ;.P.. [dn), "DH value"
Note that the encoding [F 1 (di, d2 , ... d,)] is given in terms of f and not Mf. Hence, the distribution
of [Ff(d1, d2,. . . d,)] will be a fixed value if the same is true for each [di]'. This differs from
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which may be a non-trivial distribution for all values of [1] and [K) are. This is because
the encrypting algorithm may be probabilistic, and hence there may be many valid ciphertexts for
any given plaintext/key pairs. Therefore, there are many valid encodings of {MI}K, even for M
and K that have unique representations. However, f is defined to be a function, and so the value
f ([d1],[d 2I',... [da]) will only be as probabilistic as the individual [di].
Now that we know what Dolev-Yao values represent, we can formalize their proper usage. In
previous chapters, a Dolev-Yao trace was an alternating sequence of adversary queries and the
responses of honest parties. A valid trace was one in which each adversary query was derivable
from the trace's previous messages of via a finite number of atomic operations-represented by
the application of a single closure operation. Although this representation is compact, it hides the
internal operation of the adversary. This internal reasoning of the adversary will be convenient for
our purposes, and so we will use an alternate, equivalent, representation that makes this reasoning
explicit. In this alternate representation, each adversary query must be derivable from previous
messages via a single atomic operation, but the adversary is allowed to apply any finite number of
them between participant responses.
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We require that the definition of valid traces also handle the inherent non-freeness of the adver-
sary's arbitrary computations. In particular, we will allow the adversary to apply the function f
to values di, d2 , ... d but produce a Dolev-Yao message M other than Ff(dl, d2, ... d"). We will
require, however, that the Dolev-Yao message M represent merely another way of performing the
same calculation.
Definition 37 A valid explicit Dolev-Yao trace for a group family {q,,, G}, is an alternating se-
quence:
Ro Q1 R1  Q2 R 2  Q , _n-1 Rn 1 Q, Rn
such that:
" Each Ri is a response from an honest participant, and is of the form (ni, n 2 ,. .. nj, Mi). Each
AMl E A is a message from the algebra and n1 , n2,... nj are the indices of previous elements of
the sequence which were received or sent by that participant. (The first actions of a participant
will contain no indicies.)
" Each Qj = (Qi,, Qi,2, Qi,3, - Qij) is a sequence -of adversary operations, where Qi,k has one
of the following forms:
("new text", M) where M E T,
("new nonce", M) where M G 7lAdV,
- ("new DH value", M) where M C Dp,
- ("encryption key", M) where M E ICPub,
("decryption key", M) where M E /CPriv n ICAdv,
- ("signature key", M) where Al E ksig,
- ("verification key", M) where M E CVer nf AAdu,
("symmetric key", M) where M E Ksym n kAdv,
("concatenation", n1 , n2, AY) where Al = M 1 M2 and M1 (resp. M 2) is the message of the
sequence (or sub-sequence) element indexed by n1 (resp. n2),
- ("separation-left", 71, M) where M' is the message of the sequence or subsequence element
indexed by n1 and M' = Al M" for some M",
- ("separation-right", n1 , M) where Al' is the message of the sequence or subsequence ele-
ment indexed by n1 and A' = A" A for some Al",
("encryption", n1 , n2, M) where M = {M'}K and Al' (resp K) is the message in the
sequence or subsequence element indexed by n1 (resp. 72), and K E KPub U Jsyrn,
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- ( "decryption", n 1, n2 , AY) where M' = C M|1}K for some K E KJPub U ICSym and M' (resp.
K-') is the message in the sequence (or subsequence) element indexed by n 1 (resp n2 ),
- ("signing", n 1, 722, A) where M= [M']K for some K e ICver and M' (resp. K-') is the
message in the sequence (or subsequence) element indexed by n1 (resp n 2),
- ("message from sig", n1 , Al) where Al' = [M]K for some K c Kver and A' is the message
in the sequence or subsequence element indexed by n1 ,
("hashing", n 1, M) where M C hash (M') and M' is the message of the sequence (or
sub-sequence) element indexed by n1 , or
- ("knownDH", nj, n2 , A) where M = DHdi, d2 , ni references a node with message di,
and n 2 references a node previous in the trace of the form ( "new DH value", Al),
("function", ni, n2, .. . ni, f, M) where
* M is an element of D,
* each Mi, the message of node ni, is an element of D,
* f is the description of a PPT-computable function, and
* For all tape 4-- {,1}*, [Ff (M1, M 2 ,... Mi)] = Ml.
In keeping with notation from other frameworks in formal cryptography [63, 62], we will denote by
"node" the sequence elements of honest participants and the elements of adversary sub-sequences.
We will call the last component of a node its "message."
It will soon be convenient to define the first point in a trace that uses elements from a set S:
Definition 38 A set S arises at a node n of a trace iff n is the first node of the trace with a message
in the set I = {A' : IM G S such that Al E M'}.
That is, a set arises at the first node whose message has, as an ingredient, elements of the set. Such
nodes are important because they indicate the genesis of certain elements. The node on which a
random nonce arises, for example, indicates the point at which it was randomly selected and thus
the entity that flipped the needed coins.
We will also require an analogous definition (originally from [63]) for the subterm relation:
Definition 39 A set S originates at a node n of a trace iff n is the first node of the trace with a
message in the set I = {Al' : IM E S such that M < A'}.
We also speak of a single message A arising or originating at a node n, by which we actually mean
the set {Al}.
hence, an origination point for a value v is the first place at which v could be learned or said by
the adversary. The concept of origination points is usually used in the negative, meaning that we
very often wish to prove that certain values do not originate at all. Note that the adversary is able
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to "say" (put in the trace) anything that it can deduce. Hence, one proves that a value v is secret
by showing that no trace can contain that value. More specifically, if one can show that there is
no point on which v originates, then there is no node which has that value as a subterm. (If there
is at least one node with v as a subterm, then there must be a first instance, which would be an
origination point.) Thus, to prove the non-origination of v is the Dolev-Yao way to prove secrecy of
that value.
4.4 The Security Property DH and Conservative Protocols
In this section, we will define a condition on traces which represents the computational Diffie-Hellman
assumption, and a condition on protocols which makes them efficient to execute.
The computational Diffie-Hellman assumption is relatively easy to embed in the expanded Dolev-
Yao model. Informally, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption states that if g' and gy are
chosen by honest participants, then the adversary has only negligible probability of computing gXY.
In keeping with Section 4.3.1, we represent g' by d, and gy by d2. We represent the fact that they
are chosen by honest participants by having them arise on participant nodes. The message DHdi, d2
represents gzy. We ignore negligible probabilities, and represent adversary computation via traces.
Hence, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption can be represented as:
Definition 40 (Security Property DR ) Suppose that T is a valid, explicit Dolev- Yao trace over
a protocol. The trace T satisfies condition DR if, for all da and db e D, whenever da and db arise
on participant nodes in T, then DH(da, db) does not originate on an adversary node in T.
That is, if da and db arise on honest nodes, meaning that they are chosen by honest participants,
then DH(di, d 2) does not originate at all, meaning that in particular it is secret from the adversary.
-This condition easily represents the inability of the adversary to solve the computational Diffie-
Hellman problem on its own. Suppose a trace violates this condition but contains no non-trivial
participant nodes. That is, assume that the trace contains only two participant nodes, R 1 = (di)
and R 2 = (d2 ), and that all other nodes in the trace are adversarial. Each adversary node represents
one calculation, and each such calculation can be performed efficiently. The terms dj, d 2 , and
DH(di, d2 ) represent g', gy, and gXY respectively, and so the trace represents an algorithm that
takes in g' and gY from the participants and outputs g'Y at the node containing DH(di, d 2 ). Note,
also, all of this is independent of the exact cryptographic algorithms. Hence, if the Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard, then there exists no trace that violates condition D-which does not also contain
participant actions.
But what about traces that do involve participants? For these traces, condition DR may be too
strong. There is no restriction on the actions of )articipants, after all, and so there is no prohibition
against the protocol (for example):
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On input d1 and d 2 , output Ff(DH(di, d2 ))
where f is some easily invertible permutation on the underlying group. Although DH(di, d2 ) does
not syntactically originate from this adversary, the protocol enables the adversary to compute it (by
calculating f'. A trace involving this protocol could violate condition DH, but the adversary does
not actually violate the Diffie-Hellman assumption. There is no reason to assume that the Diffie-
Hellman problem remains hard if the adversary has access to oracles (participants) that perform
intractable calculations. Hence, there is no a priori reason that condition DH must hold for traces
over arbitrary protocols.
Therefore, we restrict our attention to those protocols that do not provide assistance to the
adversary. In general, this means that protocols must be simulatable. If the (computational) adver-
sary can simulate the execution of the protocol, then honest participants give no assistance to the
adversary. Any help they could give would be already available.
Rather than to consider all simulatable protocols, which may not be easy to characterize syn-
tactically, we instead consider only a sub-class. There are many classes from which to choose; we
choose ours based on such protocols as TLS and SSH. These protocols share a natural but important
condition: participants do not "say" the key g9 y, but only hash it into key material.
Definition 41 (Silence) We say that a protocol is silent with respect to Diffie-Hellman if no ele-
ment of DDH originates on a participant node.
Here, we do mean "originate" and not "arise." The definition allows elements of DDH to arise on
participant nodes so long as they do not originate there. That is, a protocol is silent with respect
to Diffie-Hellman if, whenever DH(di, d 2) arises, it has been hashed into a symmetric key. This
property is purely syntactic and easy to verify. It also allows us to prevent, in the following way, the
honest participants from solving the computational Diffie-Hellman problem for the adversary.
In the next section, we are going to give a mapping from traces to algorithms. We will then show
that a trace T which violates condition DR must map to an algorithm that solves the computational
Diffie-Hellman problem. Interestingly enough, this result is independent of the exact computational
algorithms used in the encoding operator [],. Thus, T actually maps to an infinite number of
algorithms-one for each choice of computational algorithms-and each one of them must solve the
computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
These algorithms do not necessarily violate the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, since
the honest participants may not be efficient. Thus, even if they compute the Diffie-Hellman secret
for the Dolev-Yao adversary, the running time of the joint system (participants and adversary) will
still be larger than polynomial. If a protocol is silent, however, then we can prevent the honest
participants from aiding the adversary in any way.
If a protocol is silent, then participants can only use DH(di, d 2) as an ingredient of a symmetric
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key. This means that DH(di, d2) must be hashed before it is used, and this gives us a chance to
prevent it from being "leaked" to the computational adversary. If the computational hash algo-
rithm completely hides the pre-image, as the random oracle will, then the behavior of the honest
participant will be completely independent of the value gly. By using the random oracle as the hash
algorithm, we can map the trace T to an algorithm where the (bounded) adversary must still solve
the computational Diffie-Hellman problem even though it receives no aid from the (unbounded)
participants.
More formally:
Theorem 11 Suppose that T is a valid, explicit Dolev- Yao trace (for {g,7, Gn},}) over a silent pro-
tocol that violates condition DX. Then the existence of random oracles implies the falsehood of the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption for {g,,G .
We have used this theorem with great success to analyze real-world protocols. (See [32] for an
analysis of TLS.) Here, however, we focus not on its usage but upon its computational justification,
which we develop in the next two sections.
4.5 A Mapping from Traces to Algorithms
In this section, we provide two things:
1. A natural mapping from traces to computational algorithms that uses arbitrary computational
sub-algorithms, and
2. A proof that for any such choice of algorithms, a trace which violates condition Dh maps to
an algorithm that solves the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
The mapping will use the encoding operator [.] in an essential way, so we must extend this
operator to the remaining operations of the extended Dolev-Yao algebra:
Definition 42 (Extended encoding, II) Let 77 E IV be the security parameter. Let t E {0, 1}W
be a random tape, partitioned into a length-r segment for each element of R, IC, and D. Let
(G, E, D) be an asymmetric encryption scheme, (Gsym, Esym, Dsym) be a symmetric encryption scheme,
(Gsg, Ssig IVsig) be a digital signature scheme, and H be a hash scheme. Let {gq, G}, be a family
of cyclic groups. Then for any Al c A, the encoding of M, written [Al], is defined recursively:
" If M C D, M is of the form DH(d 1 ,d 2), or M is of the form Ff(dl,d 2 ,...d,), then [M] is
as in Definition 36.
" If Al E R, Al E ICPJ1 , Al E KPr, Al G M, Al is of the form M1 Al 2 , or Al is of the form
{M'|}K for some K c kPub, then [All is as defined in Definition 5.
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" If M = hash (M'), then [MA] is the mapping from pairs of distributions to distributions given
by (Gsym (P7, H ([AI') , "symkey"'. Note that the hash output is used as randomness to
generate a symmetric key.
* If (AlAl- 1) is a signature/verification key pair, then [Al] = (s, "sigkey") and
(v, "verkey") where (s, v) is the output of Gsig (1 7 , OUM).
" If A = [']K is an encryption, then [AfMl is the mapping from pairs of distributions to
distributions given by ([M'] , Si 9 (IM'I] , [K1) ,"sig
* If Al G CSym is a symmetric key, then [Ml = (k, "symkey") where k is the output of
Gsym(117 , UM).
" If M = {M'|}K is a symmetric encryption (meaning that K G ?Csym) then [M] is the mapping
from pairs of distributions to distributions given by (E ([M'] , [K]| , "symenc"
A word about how the mapping from traces to algorithms will proceed: The resulting algorithm
will calculate (and store in a table) a value for each node and ingredient thereof in the trace. Very
often, but not always, the value for a message Al will be drawn from [M]$. The mapping itself
assumes no properties about the cryptographic sub-algorithms, meaning we are free to choose these
sub-algorithms arbitrarily.
Definition 43 Let (G, E, D) be an asymmetric encryption scheme, (Gsym, Esym, Dsym) be a symmetric
encryption scheme, (Gsig, Ssig, Vsig) be a digital signature scheme, and H be a hash scheme. Let
G,}, be a family of cyclic groups. Let T be a trace over A. Then AT(1'7 ) is the following algorithm:
* First, a table T is created to map elements of A to bit-strings.At the beginning of the execution,
this table is empty.
* A tape t is randomly selected from {0,1}*.
* Each node in the trace is then replaced with a bit-string value, starting with the first node and
working forward. Let node n have message M. The exact manner in which a string is chosen
for n depends on n's type:
" Suppose that n is of the form ("function", n1 , n 2 ,... ni, f, M). Then:
- f is a PPT-computable function, and
- By inductive hypothesis, a value v,, has already been chosen for each node nj.
The value v, for n is chosen by running Mf(vf,, 1 vn1 2,. .. vn) and returning the output. Addi-
tionally, this is the value for T(M) (i.e., stored in the table T for message AI) if no value is
already present there.
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* If n (containing message M) is any other kind of node, then there are two cases:
- If T(M) exists, then vn is given the value of TM.
- If T(M) is not assigned (meaning that M is not in the table T) then a value v, <- [M]
is generated. Since the [.]' operator is defined recursively on the parse tree of M, the
ingredients of M are drawn from or stored in the table T during this process as well.
The above algorithm converts each node of the trace T into a bit-string. We now define what it
means for it to have performed the conversion correctly:
Definition 44 Let T be a trace and Ar be the algorithm derived from T as per Definition 43. Then
an execution of Ar is "correct" if, given that t is the tape selected at the beginning of the execution
and T is the table at the end, T(M) E [M] for all M with entries in T.
Theorem 12 If T is a valid, explicit Dolev- Yao trace, then Pr [AT (7) computes correctly ] is noti-
cable.
Proof. The only part of the algorithm what would store a value in T(M) which is not in the support
of [M]t is that which processes "function" nodes. Let n be a node of the form
("function" , n 1,n2, . . . ni, f, M).
Then by induction, each nj is a previous node with message Mj, and the probability
Vni E supp [Mj]t > 1
for some polynomial qj and sufficiently large 71.
The value v, is found by running Mf on vi, V2,... v,. By assumption
1
q(77)
for some polynomial q and all sufficiently large q. But notice that the distribution
f ([Ml] , [MI2],... [M1i]) = Ff ([AII , [M 2 ],... [Mi], )
Thus
F tl
Pr f(vn , vn2 ,... v,) C supp [Ff([AMil], [M;,. .. [M 7 ]; ) Pr [vnj E supp [AI,]
S j=1
i 1
>1 (
j = qj (7)
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and
Pr a +- Mf (vnr vn2 .. .vni) : a E supp Ff ([All] , [A 2 I ,. .. [fi];)t I i .q(n) nq (
t
However, we know from the definition of valid traces that fFf ([M1lt [M 2]',... [A l = [M]1.
Furthermore, the value T(M) stored in the table is drawn from Mf (V, Vn2, ... Vni). Thus
Pr t 0- {O, 1}' T(M) E supp [MI]
q(n) =1 (n)
for some all sufficiently large q.
Furthermore, a trace has only a constant number of "function" nodes, so the probability the
algorithm calculates and stores the correct value for each remains noticeable over the entire execution
of the algorithm.
Corollary 13 Suppose AT correctly executes, and let T be the table at the end of the execution. For
all d1 , d2 E D, if T(d1) = gx and T(d2 ) = gy, then T(DH(d 1 ,d 2 )) = gXY.
Proof. If the algorithm correctly executes, then T(M) E supp [M]. Thus if T(di) contains gx,
then [d 1] = gx with probability 1 (where t is the tape chosen by AT. Similarly, [(] d2 ) - gy with
probability 1. Hence, [DH(di, d 2)] = gxy with probability 1, and T(DH(di, d2 )) will contain gxy.
Hence, if a trace uses DH(di, d2 ) at any point, then the algorithm can be used to solve the Diffie-
Hellman problem. Notice that the cryptographic algorithms are not used except to convert messages
to bit-strings, so AT will work no matter how they are chosen. However, the algorithm AT may not
be computable in PPT. As described, it requires that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem be
solved for each term DH(di, d2 ) in the trace that doesn't arise on an f-node. In particular, if the
trace contains an instance of DH(di, d2 ) that arises on a participant node, the resulting algorithm
may be forced to solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In the next section, we discuss a
way around this difficulty.
4.6 Hashing and the Random Oracle
Assume that there exists a trace over a silent protocol which violates security property D'H. As shown
in the previous section, this trace maps to an algorithm that solves the Diffie-Hellman problem no
matter how the computational cryptographic algorithms are chosen for the encoding operation.
However, the resulting algorithm may not be efficient. In particular, the algorithm assigns the
value gy' to the formal term DH(di, d2 ) (when it also assigns g' to di and gY to d2 ). This may
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require the algorithm to solve the computational Diffie-Hellnan problem directly-an operation we
are explicitly assuming to be inefficient.
However, all adversary nodes are efficiently computable; the algorithm would only need to solve
Diffie-Hellman when calculating the values on participant nodes. Furthermore, we now assume that
all of the participant nodes are silent, and hence Diffie-Hellman values are only used on participant
nodes to make symmetric keys. Since we assume that making a key from a Diffie-Hellman value
involves hashing it first, we can use this to avoid an infeasible computation.
The central idea is that, if the output of the hashing algorithm is completely independent of the
input, then the honest participants can provide no aid to the adversary. More formally, the honest
participants can be simulated by simply choosing random values for the hash algorithm to output-
thus avoiding the need to calculate the pre-image, which might include the secret Diffie-Hellman
value. For simplicity, we use the strongest possible hash algorithm: the random oracle. (We will
later discuss the possibility of weaker constructions.)
Theorem 11 Suppose that T is a valid, explicit Dolev- Yao trace (for {g, Gn}) over a silent pro-
tocol that violates condition DR-. Then the existence of random oracles implies the falsehood of the
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption for {gn,G .
Proof. By assumption, T is over a silent protocol and violates security property Dh. Then:
e d, and d 2 arise only on participant nodes in T,
* DH(di, d2 ) does not originate on a participant node, but
* DH (di, d 2 ) originates in T.
Let n be the node on which DH(di, d2 ) originates. Note that n must be an adversary node. By
inspecting the form of adversary nodes, we see that the message of n must be DH(di, d2 ) itself. (If
the message contained DH(di, d2 ) as a subterm, then DH(di, d 2 ) must be an subterm of a previous
node and n would origination at n.)
Let TI, be the set of all nodes in T which are before n. We construct an adversary A that breaks
the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the following way: A(1i, g, g', gY) simulates ATI,,
with the following important exceptions:
1. Instead of the table T being empty at initialization, it contains an entry mapping di to gx and
an entry mapping d2 to gY.
2. When AT,, calculates a value for DH(d0 ,db), it seems to need to solve the Diffie-Heliman
problem in order to do so. However, we can avoid this calculation by considering the kinds of
nodes which would cause AT, to calculate a value for DH(da, db).
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" It could be a f node, in which case A simulates Mf as ATj, would.
" It could be an adversary node of the form ("knownDH", ni, 712, DH(di, d2 )). In this case,
however, d2 E Dp, and so the exponent of gy = T(d 2) can be found on the segment of
tape t assigned to d2.
" If could be a participant node, in which case we know that DH(da, db) is not a subterm
of the node in question. (If it were, then it would have originated there.) Let the node in
question contain message Al. Since it is an ingredient but not a subterm of M, we can
see that DH(da, db) E; hash (N) E M by examination of the term structure. Therefore,
we only need to calculate a Diffie-Hellman value to hash it into a symmetric key.
We employ a trick: instead of calculating the hash, we store a random value instead.
That is, instead of calculating Al normally, A chooses a random r of the proper length
for hash (N) and stores it in the table T. It does not calculate a value for N or any of its
ingredients (including DH(da, db)) as part of this calculation.
When finished simulating ATj,, the adversary A selects the value gZ calculated for the node n
and returns gZ as its output.
What is the likelihood that the new algorithm A will output the correct value?
Let us revisit the original algorithm ATI,. We know from Theorem 12 that for some polynomial
q and all sufficiently large 77:
1
Pr [AT,, (i1) computes properly] >
Note that we can modify AT,, to take the values for d, and d2 as inputs. In that case, running the
new algorithm on random inputs is exactly the same as running it before the modifications:
Pr[ X, y - 1,2,...,Gol}
A7-1,, (11, gx, g) computes properly ] > g
We can also modify ATI, to output g-, where (gZ, "DH value") is the value computed for node n.
Due to Corollary 13:
Pr[ Xy<- {1, 2, ... , lGqj};
g z <- A - , (1,n, g,gX, g Y):
That is, the original algorithm AT, can calculate the Diffie-Hellman value gxy with some polynomial
probability. But we are running A, not ArW. Will the new algorithm have the same advantage? A
uses random values for hashing, while the original algorithm Ar,, calculates the values by application
of the hash algorithm for AT,,. However, we can choose the hash algorithm arbitrarily, and so we
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can choose the random oracle. In this case, the hash values are random, and so this A has exactly
the same probability of success as ATri.
In other words, suppose that the random oracle exists. If there exists a valid, explicit Dolev-Yao
trace over a silent protocol that violates the security property D'H of Definition 40, the computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption is false over the group family in question. Conversely, if the Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard over the group and the random oracle is assumed, then there can be no silent and
conservative trace which violates the security condition D'X.
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Chapter 5
Related and Future Work
5.1 Computational Soundness for the Dolev-Yao Model
The first connection between the Dolev-Yao and the computational models was established in work
by Abadi and Rogaway ( [3, 4], and continued in [2] and [45, 46]) which served as a great source of
inspiration for this work. In particular, these authors derived and implemented the symmetric-key
version of Theorem 3. Our indistinguishability property is derived for the public-key encryption
setting, and is both stronger than theirs in some places and weaker than theirs in others. More
importantly, however, we go on to use our indistinguishability property to achieve non-malleability.
The relationship between indistinguishability and non-malleability depends on the setting (see [7]
for an examination of this issue). In purely computational definitions of encryption security, for
example, non-malleability always implies indistinguishability, but the converse is not always true.
The results of this paper, interestingly, are exactly the opposite. We show that indistinguishability
(Theorem 3) implies non-malleability (Definitions 10 and 12) in the Dolev-Yao setting. This serves
as strong evidence that non-malleability implies indistinguishability, but the question is still open.
Another two related research efforts in this area are those of Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner [6],
and Micciancio and Warinschi [47]. In general, these investigations represent protocol executions in
two different ways: a "real" setting and an "ideal" setting. In the "real" setting, the execution of a
protocol is represented as the communication of Turing machines that use computational encryption
to create bit-string messages. The two lines of research differ in their representation of the "ideal"
setting. Backes et al. use a 'database' that stores all messages and tracks which ones are known by
whom. This database allows the adversary to access only those messages it would be able to deduce
in the Dolev-Yao paradigm. Micciancio and Warinschi, on the other hand, represent the ideal setting
directly as symbolic execution in the Dolev-Yao model. The main results of both efforts state that
any behavior that an honest participant can see in the "real" setting could also be seen in the "ideal"
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setting. Hence, a proof of security in the "ideal" setting will serve as a proof in the "real" setting
(modulo negligible probabilities).
These works are extremely compelling. However, they focus attention onto the behavior of the
adversary as a whole. That is, they regard the adversary's behavior as an unknowable mystery
which cannot be broken into component parts. We, on the other hand, regard the behavior of the
adversary as a series of message creations, and leverage a statement about a single creation into a
statement about the adversary's behavior as a whole.
A less similar approach to the same problem is a recent effort to incorporate polynomial-time
indistinguishability into process algebras [36, 37, 42, 48, 49]. Process algebras introduce grammars for
processes that typically encompass a large number of higher-level programming constructs. They
also introduce a number of algebraic rewrite and cancellation laws that allow one to prove two
processes equivalent, that their observable behaviors are equivalent, or that the observable behavior
of one process is a subset of the observable behavior of another. In this framework, one can prove
a given process to be "safe" by showing that its observable behavior is the same as, or a subset of,
the observable behavior of an idealized "specification" process.
This idea has recently been expanded to include new types of "equivalent" behavior. In particular,
the definitions of both process and observable behavior have been expanded to include probabilistic
behavior. This allows the definition of "observationally equivalent" to mean "indistinguishable
to any polynomial-time environient or distinguisher." This approach does not provide the tools
necessary to prove an original indistinguishability result, but it does allow one to prove that some
given indistinguishability result follows from another one. Furthermore, this derivation uses the
high-level rewrite and cancellation rules of the algebra rather than direct reductions.
5.2 Plaintext-Aware Encryption
Plaintext-awareness (the random-oracle form) was originally introduced as an intermediate definition
in the chosen-ciphertext security proof of an asymmetric encryption scheme [10]. However, it was
later shown to be strictly stronger than chosen-ciphertext security [7]. This same work also showed
that plaintext-awareness implied chosen-ciphertext security. It further refined the original definition
in much the same way that the ally oracle refines ours: by incorporating the adversary's access to
externally-generated ciphertexts.
There have been previous efforts to remove the random-oracle assumption from the definition of
plaintext-awareness [51]. However, these apply only to specific encryption schemes, and are not as
strong as the original definition. We are, as far we know., the only work to propose such a radical
redefinition of plaintext awareness.
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5.3 Diffie-Hellman and the Dolev-Yao Model
We believe this to be the first effort to use the computational model to incorporate Diffie-Hellman
into the formal model. Previous work on protocols that use Diffie-Hellman [56, 40] have assumed a
strictly formal adversary. That is, they assume an adversary with an explicitly enumerated set of
operations. Although the sets of operations chosen in these works include some appropriate to the
Diffie-Hellman scheme, they do not consider the possibility of arbitrary efficient computations. Our
work, on the other hand, assumes only what can be justified in terms of computational cryptography.
Hence, proofs in our framework will be as strong as the Diffie-Hellman assumption. (Note, however,
our work is not as widely applicable as that in [56]: we cannot yet consider common group-keying
protocols, for example.)
However, our approach currently uses the random oracle. Of course, our original results on the
standard Dolev-Yao model used the random oracle as well. We believe that the random oracle
plays the same role in both instances: a technical simplification that bridges some purely computa-
tional difficulties. In the case of our original Dolev-Yao work, the random oracle (via the original
definition of plaintext-awareness) allowed us to prove that computational soundness for Dolev-Yao
non-malleability existed. This, in turn, allowed us to find a more sophisticated soundness that did
not use the random oracle. Similarly, now that we have demonstrated one version of soundness for
the Dolev-Yao Diffie-Hellman, we anticipate future work that remove the random oracle.
In particular, the random oracle was used here to make the hash of a secret independent of
the secret itself. The fact that it is a secret being hashed indicates that the same result could
be accomplished with a weaker construction. In particular, a pseudo-random function might work
instead, although a chicken-and-egg problem could result if the seed for this function needs to be
secret and independent. Another possibility is to extract the (limited) amount of computational
entropy guaranteed by the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. (See [13] for a discussion of
entropy under this assumption. See also [23] for a study of a very similar problem.)
We trust that future work will examine this issue, and will be able to remove the random oracle
from our results.
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Appendix A
Index of notation
A.1 The standard Dolev-Yao model
We use the following notation for sets and operations in the setting of formal cryptography:
A - B:.M
M, N
K- 1
M N
A
T
/C
'(Pub
Cpriv
C[S]
RAd,
lZlAd
R \ RAdv
KSubv
KA
patternPk (11, T)
TAI
.A E N
M -< N
T
n
Entity A sends the message M, addressed to B. (No guarantee that it
reaches B.)
Arbitrary elements of A
Message Al encrypted using key K.
Function that maps an asymmetric key the other of the pair, and a sym-
metric key to itself
The concatenation of messages M and N
The formal algebra of terms
The set of plaintexts
The set of names
The set of nonces
The set of keys
The set of public keys
The set of private keys
The closure of set S
Nonces chosen by the adversary
Private keys chosen adversary
Nonces whose values are picked randomly by honest participants
Keys of principals subverted by the adversary after their keys have been
chosen
The public key of entity A
The public-key pattern of M Given the set of keys T.
The type tree of M
Al is an ingredient of M
Al is a subterm of M
A Dolev-Yao trace
A node
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A.2 Computational sets and operations
We use the following notation for sets and operations in the setting of computational cryptography:
77
f < neg(77)
D77 -o D'f
Af
X <- D
Pr [ai, a 2 ,.  P1
G
E
D
Gsym, Esym, Dsym
Gsig, Sig, Vsig
H
e
d
S
V
k
C
sig
Parameter
Coins
PublicKey
PrivateKey
Ciphertext
Plaintext
String
A
D1 C D2
P
V
S
E
0
'P
PPT
supp D
TRANSA,B (x, rA y, rB)
VIEW'B (xAy, TB)
OUA (X,rAjy,rB)OUTA,B (X, gA Y, rB)
G, G77
9
Security parameter
The function f is negligible in the security parameter
Distribution families De and D' are computationally indistinguishable
Distribution families D. and D' are computationally indistinguishable
with respect to oracle 0
The natural numbers
x is drawn from the distribution D. (If D is a set, x is drawn uniformly
from D.)
The probability that predicate p is true after experiments a,, a2 ...
The key generation algorithm for public-key encryption
The encryption algorithm for public-key encryption
The decryption algorithm for public-key encryption
The key generation, encryption and decryption algorithms (respec-
tively) for symmetric encryption
Signature key generation, signature and verification algorithms (respec-
tively)
The hash evaluation algorithm
A computational encryption key
A computational decryption key
A computational signature key
A computational verification key
A computational symmetric key
A computational ciphertext
A signature
The set of security parameters (typically K)
The set of random tapes (coin flips)
The set of possible public keys
The set of possible private keys
The set of possible encryptions
The set of possible plaintexts
{O, 1*, the set of finite bit strings
The adversary
Distributions D 1 and D 2 are computationally indistinguishable
The prover of an interactive proof system
The verifier of an interactive proof system
The simulator
The reference string for a NIZK
The extractor
An oracle
The complexity class
The complexity class
The support of probability distribution D
Transcript of protocol between A and B
View of A during protocol with B
Output of A after protocol with B
Group over which Diffie-Hellman exchange is performed
Generator of Diffie-Hellman group
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A.3 Expansions to the Dolev-Yao model
The finite version of the A
The finite version of R
The finite version of KPub
The finite version of K Priv
Message M with a signature verifiable with key K.
Set of formal Diffie-Hellman values
Formal Diffie-Hellman operation
Set of Diffie-Hellman values which result from the [
(range of DH)
Set of formal Diffie-Hellman values generated by t
D)
Hash operation
Dolev-Yao operator to represent function f
The set of signing keys
The set of verification keys
The set of symmetric keys
A,
R77
k Priv
[M]K
D
DH
DDH
DP
hash
Ff
csig
KCVer
KCsym
A.4 Sets and operations used to connect formal and compu-
tational settings
We use the following notation for sets and operations used to bridge and connect the formal and
computational settings:
[M]$ The distribution of II, induced by running the Convert algorithm on
.AI
Function from formal name to bit-strings
t The tape used to generate atomic terms
t () Function from expressions to tags
Vis, (0-) String c- is visible in string 7
V, Value given to node in algorithm AT
T Table of algorithm AT
Mf Machine to evaluate function f
A.5 Mathematics
x <- D x is drawn from distribution D
x <- S x is drawn uniformly from distribution D
V s.l. r7 For all sufficiently large q (3r/7 s. t. Vi7 > r7o)
IxI Bit-length of x
A.6 Plaintext-Awareness
h < 4- A Extract current history from A
RU Registration user
RA Registration authority
L Ally oracle
s Private input for ally
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